Supplementary Materials for Border Fortification and Legibility: Evidence from Afghanistan

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Contents

A Data Description

In this brief empirical appendix, I introduce supplemental results.

A.1 Border Fortification in Afghanistan

Figure A-1 depicts Afghan Border Force (ABF) fortifications across Afghanistan. ABF forts had several common design features, including: observation towers; barracks; facilities for water supply, electrical generation, and dining; training grounds; and outer walls composed of gabions and barbed wire. The paper's independent variable captures the presence of these facilities, from which patrols and surveillance were organized. I describe the legibility-building tactics employed by ABF forces below.

Figure A-1: Design of ABF Border Forts

(a) ABF Fort in Kandahar (b) ABF Fort in Hilmand (c) ABF Fort in Hirat

Note: Panels depict ABF forts in: (a) Kandahar Province (USACE Afghanistan Engineer District–South, 2012); (b) Hilmand Province (Hendricks, 2020); and (c) Hirat Province (Delgadillo, 2013).

Table 1 documents 14 counterinsurgency tactics used by government forces to improve government knowledge of the human and physical terrain of under-served, conflict-affected regions. This typology of tactics extends work by Mir (2018*b*), who describes counterinsurgent practices intended to build legibility and improve information flows to government forces. Below, I briefly describe each of the 14 tactics from Table 1, and document their importance to ABF troops in Afghanistan in the period under study.

Population and Resource Control — a set of tactics designed to improve legibility by allowing counterinsurgent forces to catalogue, track, and monitor people, goods, and land in a conflict-affected area

- **Mapping** — by mapping villages and terrain in conflict-affected areas, counterinsurgent forces can hone targeting of violence and develop deeper community awareness (Trinquier, 1964; Anderson, 1983). In Afghanistan, ABF officers worked to improve out-dated maps and systematize village naming-conventions to facilitate patrolling around border forts and communities (Best, 2014; Karimi, 2019; Morgan, 2021).

- **Census-Taking** — census data allow government authorities to measure useful population and economic indicators, and can help authorities build awareness of biographical information, family and clan networks, and socioeconomic needs. These data are vital in many counterinsurgent settings (Belge, 2016; Lieberman and Singh, 2017; Lee, 2020). Afghanistan has not fielded a full census since 1979.

- **Biometric Documentation** — identity documents with biometric signatures help counterinsurgent forces regulate and track individuals moving in conflict-affected communities, and enable identity verification (Shrout, 2011; Voelz, 2015). In Afghanistan, ABF troops facilitated the SEEK program, which biometrically-registered notable civilians in border communities (Woodward, 2005; Lopez, 2012; Mackie, 2012*b*), and the e-tazkera program, which provided identity cards to Afghan civilians (Bjelica and van Bijlert, 2016). These border forces also biometrically-scanned cross-border travelers and trained to distinguish fake identity documents (Rustine, 2011).

- **Property Logs** — information on property sales and purchases, trade, and other economic transactions can help counterinsurgents detect and interdict smuggling and exchange of illicit war materiel (Mir, 2018*b*; Sweet, 2021; Albertus, 2020). In Afghanistan, ABF forces maintained customs and property logs covering cross-border trade, as well as property books covering internal equipment procurement (SIGAR, 2014).

- **Forced Resettlement** — by forcing civilians into protected villages, counterinsurgents can clear insurgent-held terrain for suppression, simplifying the task of discrimination. This practice was widely used in the Vietnam, where government forces coerced civilians into Strategic Hamlets, rendering border territories sparsely-populated free-fire zones (Ellsberg, 2003; Kalyvas and Kocher, 2009). There is no evidence ABF forces engaged in this practice, which often exacerbated civilians' grievances.

Human Intelligence Gathering — a set of tactics designed to improve legibility by allowing counterinsurgent forces to collect information and tips about civilians and insurgents in a conflict-affected area, primarily through human sources

- **Arrests and Detentions** — by arresting, detaining, and interrogating insurgent and criminal suspects, counterinsurgent forces can build intelligence about illicit and violent actors, their networks, and planned operations. Captured insurgent suspects in particular offer insight into the inner-workings of rebel organizations during interrogations (Teamey, 2007; Mir, 2018*b*). The ABF frequently detained smugglers and insurgent rank-and-file and leaders in border communities, and leveraged arrests to gain working knowledge of cross-border militant operations (CJTF–82, 2007; ISAF, 2008).

- **Detainee Release** — by releasing wrongfully-detained and reconciled or low-risk insurgent fighters back into their communities, counterinsurgent forces can build good-will, increasing civilian willingness to inform (Blair, 2022). Released detainees also frequently share information on insurgent activities ongoing in their villages. The ABF worked with local elders at borderland shuras to identify wrongfully-detained or low-risk insurgent suspects and release them in exchange for information (Stump, 2010). Through Program Tahkim-e Sulh, which operated from 2005–2011, ABF commanders worked with local elders, who identified reconcilable insurgents. With sponsorship from community

elders, ABF forces released reconcilable detainees and provided aid to their communities in exchange for information about insurgents (SIGAR, 2019, p. 29-32).

- **Tiplines and Informants** — by publicizing fora for civilian informing, such as mobile tiplines, and by cultivating civilian and insurgent informants, counterinsurgents can augment the flow of useful information from violence-affected communities (Berman, Shapiro and Felter, 2011; Schutte, 2017; Shaver and Shapiro, 2021). The ABF often cultivated civilian informants and distributed messages about government tiplines; using tips from civilians, helped border forces discriminately target insurgent caches, bombs, and bases (CJTF–82, 2009; ISAF, 2010; Mackie, 2012*c*).

- **Amnesties and Reintegration** — counterinsurgents can encourage defection of insurgent cadres from rebel organizations by offering amnesty and reintegration opportunities. By identifying reconcilable insurgents and trading reintegration for information on the structure and plans of insurgents in the field, amnesties represent a powerful tool for building legibility (Long, 2016; Jeffery, 2018). The ABF advertised reintegration opportunities through meetings, broadcasts, and media distribution while patrolling borderland communities (Young, 2012). From 2010-2016, ABF officers worked with village elders at shuras to identify insurgents interested in reintegration opportunities under the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (SIGAR, 2019, p. 34-36).

- **Community Meetings** — by meeting and engaging with local civilians, counterinsurgent forces can cultivate respect and support (Blair, Karim and Morse, 2019). Community meetings are central in population-centric strategies because through community-led discussions, counterinsurgents can discern local civilians preferences, desires, and needs. Knowing information about community needs helps refine targeting of aid and security programs, maximizing their effectiveness (Berman et al., 2013; Dasgupta, Gawande and Kapur, 2017; Sexton and Zürcher, 2023). ABF forces staged hundreds of village-level meetings (i.e., shuras and jirgas) with local elders in borderland communities, deepening their knowledge of key community issues (Smith, 2010*a*; Aguila, 2012; Murtazashvili, 2016). In one prominent case, the ABF-convened Shinwari jirga facilitated an anti-Taliban pact between borderland tribes (Smith, 2010*a*).

Technology-Enabled Intelligence Gathering — a set of tactics designed to improve legibility by allowing counterinsurgent forces to collect information about civilians and insurgents in a conflict-affected area, primarily through technology-enabled intelligence operations

- **Ground Surveillance** — a basic responsibility of counterinsurgent forces is to conduct surveillance patrols with an aim of reconnoitering insurgent strongholds (Morgan, 2021). By staging foot patrols augmented with equipment (e.g., night-vision), reconnaissance teams can observe insurgent and civilian "patterns-of-life" (Mir, 2018*b*, p. 415-416). Building information about normal patterns in border regions helps border forces identify irregular movements and thwart rebel operations. In Afghanistan, the ABF conducted regular surveillance patrols, observing civilian and insurgent activities and preparing missions when suspicious activity was observed (Mackie, 2012*a*,*b*).

- **Aerial Surveillance** — like ground surveillance operations, which require human teams in observation of target areas, counterinsurgents also frequently employ aerial surveillance to monitor rugged and remote border regions (Williams, 2007). Drones have proven particularly useful for monitoring and surveilling cross-border movements and insurgent activities. While the ABF lacked its own capacity for aerial surveillance, ABF troops were fed information from U.S., NATO, and ANSF aerial reconnaissance assets in border regions (Updegraff, 2017).

- **Signals Intercepts** — signals intelligence, including intercepts of phone calls, radio broadcasts, and text messages, can help counterinsurgent forces understand, assess, and anticipate insurgent battlefield operations (Moltke, 2019). Sophisticated electronic eavesdropping technology has also enabled counterinsurgent forces to track the habits, movements, and communications of suspected

insurgents (Mir, 2018*a*). ABF forces used radios to listen to and track insurgent communications and broadcast pro-government messages (Smith, 2010*b*), and used jamming devices to interfere with insurgent media broadcasts (Walters Jr. and Traugutt, 2017).

- **Counter-Reconnaissance** — by undertaking efforts to detect insurgent spy operations and interfere with enemy surveillance activities, counterinsurgents can protect their own operational security. Counter-reconnaissance missions also give counterinsurgent forces insight into how enemy combatants endeavor to collect their own information (Sonin and Wright, 2023). The ABF conducted perimeter patrols and other counter-reconnaissance missions around border forts to detect, observe, and defend against insurgent threats, and gather intelligence on enemy spy techniques (Thompson, 2010).

A.2 Summary Statistics

Descriptive statistics for the main analyses are available here.

Table A-1: Summary Statistics – District Analyses

	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dependent Variables					
Elder Shuras and Jirgas (=1)	5180	0.278	0.448	0.000	1.000
Elder Shuras and Jirgas (Per 100k Pop.)	5180	0.857	2.500	0.000	65.662
Surveillance Operations (=1)	5180	0.272	0.445	0.000	1.000
Surveillance Operations (Per 100k Pop.)	5180	0.792	3.085	0.000	102.393
Counter-Reconnaissance Operations (=1)	5180	0.091	0.287	0.000	1.000
Counter-Reconnaissance Operations (Per 100k Pop.)	5180	0.197	2.178	0.000	180.505
Arrests and Detentions (=1)	5180	0.433	0.496	0.000	1.000
Arrests and Detentions (Per 100k Pop.)	5180	2.572	7.088	0.000	134.073
Detainees Released (=1)	5180	0.025	0.156	0.000	1.000
Detainees Released (Per 100k Pop.)	5180	0.022	0.244	0.000	12.799
Insurgents Reintegrated (=1)	5180	0.150	0.357	0.000	1.000
Insurgents Reintegrated (Per 100k Pop.)	5180	0.255	0.937	0.000	27.457
Tips: All Violent Threats (=1)	5180	0.743	0.437	0.000	1.000
Tips: All Violent Threats (Per 100k Pop.)	5180	12.269	25.594	0.000	545.478
Tips: Explosive Threats (=1)	5180	0.637	0.481	0.000	1.000
Tips: Explosive Threats (Per 100k Pop.)	5180	5.841	13.435	0.000	404.081
Tips: Threats Against Civilians (=1)	5180	0.257	0.437	0.000	1.000
Threats Against Civilians (Per 100k Pop.)	5180	0.567	1.710	0.000	45.662
Explosive Hazards Found/Cleared (=1)	5180	0.598	0.490	0.000	1.000
Explosive Hazards Found/Cleared (Per 100k Pop.)	5180	10.208	29.018	0.000	434.465
Weapons Caches Found/Cleared (=1)	5180	0.368	0.482	0.000	1.000
Weapons Caches Found/Cleared (Per 100k Pop.)	5180	3.040	11.768	0.000	215.293
All Counterinsurgent Activities (=1)	5180	0.345	0.476	0.000	1.000
All Counterinsurgent Activities (Per 100k Pop.)	5180	0.922	2.723	0.000	102.393
Police Actions (=1)	5180	0.052	0.221	0.000	1.000
Police Actions (Per 100k Pop.)	5180	0.069	0.474	0.000	12.799
Supportive Civilian Events (=1)	5180	0.045	0.208	0.000	1.000
Supportive Civilian Events (Per 100k Pop.)	5180	0.058	0.418	0.000	12.799
All Smuggling (=1)	5180	0.286	0.452	0.000	1.000
All Smuggling (Per 100k Pop.)	5180	0.748	2.247	0.000	50.454
Narcotics Smuggling (=1)	5180	0.124	0.329	0.000	1.000
Narcotics Smuggling (Per 100k Pop.)	5180	0.253	1.264	0.000	42.487
Arms Smuggling (=1)	5180	0.174	0.379	0.000	1.000
Arms Smuggling (Per 100k Pop.)	5180	0.364	1.312	0.000	37.256
Illicit Finance (=1)	5180	0.300	0.458	0.000	1.000
Illicit Finance (Per 100k Pop.)	5180	0.646	1.843	0.000	57.978
Ransom Kidnapping (=1)	5180	0.201	0.401	0.000	1.000
Ransom Kidnapping (Per 100k Pop.)	5180	0.397	1.226	0.000	25.786
Rural Unrest (=1)	5180	0.096	0.295	0.000	1.000
Rural Unrest (Per 100k Pop.)	5180	0.125	0.603	0.000	20.274
Tribal Feuds (=1)	5180	0.027	0.163	0.000	1.000
Tribal Feuds (Per 100k Pop.)	5180	0.041	0.316	0.000	10.091
Demonstrations (=1)	5180	0.072	0.259	0.000	1.000
Demonstrations (Per 100k Pop.)	5180	0.084	0.476	0.000	20.274
Independent Variables					
Border Fortification	5180	0.148	0.355	0.000	1.000
District-Level Control Variables					
Pashto-Speaking Share	5180	0.496	0.415	0.000	1.000
Non-Government Control	5180	0.214	0.410	0.000	1.000
NATO Presence	5180	1.707	7.661	0.000	68.000
ANSF Presence	5180	0.220	0.414	0.000	1.000
ALP Presence	5180	0.162	0.368	0.000	1.000

Note: The sample includes districts in border provinces. Estimates are scaled using analytic population weights.

Table A-2: Summary Statistics – Individual Analyses

	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dependent Variables					
ANSF is Discriminate	109175	0.631	0.483	0.000	1.000
Willing to Report IED to ANSF	57956	0.759	0.428	0.000	1.000
Government Most Responsible for Security	214041	0.575	0.494	0.000	1.000
Informal/Local Institutions Most Responsible for Security	214041	0.368	0.482	0.000	1.000
Identify Myself by My Nationality	19688	0.652	0.476	0.000	1.000
Household Draws Monthly Income	154676	0.888	0.316	0.000	1.000
Dissatisfied With Employment Situation	37242	0.592	0.491	0.000	1.000
Employed Full-Time	73331	0.329	0.470	0.000	1.000
Employed Part-Time	73331	0.186	0.389	0.000	1.000
Favorable View of Traffickers in My Area	162407	0.080	0.271	0.000	1.000
Local Notables Have Most Impact on Economy	126354	0.039	0.194	0.000	1.000
Witnessed Police Behave Improperly	140417	0.209	0.407	0.000	1.000
Experienced Police Corruption	109489	0.239	0.427	0.000	1.000
Independent Variables					
Border Fortification	214180	0.151	0.358	0.000	1.000
Individual-Level Control Variables					
Age	214180	34.786	12.093	15.000	99.000
Age^2	214180	1356.303	965.071	225.000	9801.000
Female	214180	0.411	0.492	0.000	1.000
Schooling: None	214180	0.600	0.490	0.000	1.000
Schooling: 1st to 6th Grade	214180	0.138	0.345	0.000	1.000
Schooling: 7th to 9th Grade	214180	0.100	0.299	0.000	1.000
Schooling: 10th to 12th Grade	214180	0.124	0.330	0.000	1.000
Schooling: University	214180	0.029	0.168	0.000	1.000
Schooling: Other	214180	0.000	0.011	0.000	1.000
Economic Situation Improving in Past Year	213929	0.288	0.453	0.000	1.000
National Government Performance Index	214020	0.028	1.019	-1.331	2.446
District Government Performance Index	176520	0.011	0.998	-1.860	2.949
Army Present At Least Weekly	213482	0.392	0.488	0.000	1.000
Police Present At Least Weekly	213808	0.547	0.498	0.000	1.000
Perceived Insurgent Control	213432	0.170	0.376	0.000	1.000
Perceived Contested Control	213432	0.080	0.271	0.000	1.000
# of People Present for Interview	214180	2.971	1.201	1.000	38.000
Respondent Comprehension	214180	1.618	0.761	1.000	4.000
Respondent Comfortability	214180	1.585	0.736	1.000	4.000

Note: The sample includes districts in border provinces. Estimates are scaled using sampling weights.

A.3 Significant Activities (SIGACTs)

Administrative records in the main analyses come from the Significant Activities (SIGACTs) dataset declassified and released by U.S. Central Command. The SIGACTs records cover the period from 2008–2014, and form the most comprehensive account of insurgent and counterinsurgent operations during the War in Afghanistan, totalling more than 430,000+ individual events (Shaver and Wright, 2017). The SIGACTs data draw from a secure, classified platform populated using highly-detailed combat reports logged by NATO and Afghan troops and police, including ABF, ANSF, and ALP forces. Equipped with satellite-linked GPS equipment in the field, these forces recorded the geolocation of every reported event at a highly-granular level, and the time-stamp of every reported event down to the minute in time. While most extant work studies a subset of the SIGACTs data covering insurgent engagements against counterinsurgent forces (e.g. Fetzer et al., 2021; Blair, 2023*a*), the rich SIGACTs reports also cover a range of counterinsurgent-initiated operations, police actions, and other notable community events (e.g. Sonin and Wright, 2023). Because records were gathered by soldiers in the field, data collection was not subject to access constraints like insurgent territorial control, which plague survey- and media-based event trackers (Weidmann, 2016).

Although these records do not suffer reporting bias inherent in media-based conflict event data, they do have several relevant weaknesses (Berman, Shapiro and Felter, 2011, p. 790, 808-809). First, incidents are only detected when NATO or Afghan forces are present, and so undercount the total volume of events other than insurgenct attacks against counterinsurgent forces. Second, counterinsurgent units may differ in their propensity for reporting any given event. I address both concerns in the manuscript.

Figure A-2: Total SIGACTs and ANQAR Respondents in Afghanistan



Note: The left panel depicts the number of SIGACTs (2008–2014) across districts in Afghanistan. The right panel depicts the number of ANQAR respondents (2008–2016) across districts in Afghanistan.

The first concern raises the risk that border fortification is mechanically positively correlated with SIGACTs, since deployment of ABF forces could increase observability of events. I take several steps to address this concern, including controlling for presence of non-ABF forces (Table C-13). Moreover, in Tables C-14 I compare the effects of border fortification on key outcomes to the effects of non-fort security presence. If it is the case that border fortification *merely* increases the observability of violence, the effect of fortification should be indistinguishable from the effect of NATO, ANSF, or ALP deployments, which also increase counterinsurgent presence and capacity for event detection. Encouragingly, I find mostly unique effects of border fortification. The second concern raises the risk that changes in unit-level ABF leadership lead to shifts in reporting policies. I am sanguine because (Berman, Shapiro and Felter, 2011, p. 790) investigate this concern in the Iraqi context and find no evidence that errors from unit-level differences in reporting threshholds are nonrandom with respect to the variables of interest. Moreover, documentary evidence from Afghanistan suggests NATO advisory teams pushed ABF forces to standardize information and reporting guidelines (Baer, 2023), reducing concern about heterogeneous reporting standards.

A.4 ANQAR Survey

I supplement analyses of administrative records with analyses of 370,000+ individual-level survey responses from the nationally-representative Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR) survey (Figure A-2). I specifically study data from waves 2–32 of ANQAR, covering the 4th quarter of 2008 – the 2nd quarter of 2016. ANQAR data were gathered by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR), an Afghan subsidiary of the international research firm D3 Systems, which NATO contracted to design and field various atmospherics surveys. ACSOR was contracted in part because NATO viewed it as a high-fidelity implementing partner: it was led by survey methodologists, and its chairman held a social science Ph.D.

The administrative district was the primary sampling unit in ANQAR, and districts were selected via a probability-proportional-to-size systematic sampling approach. After districts were sampled, secondary sampling units composed of villages were randomly selected. A random walk method was used to iden-

tify target households, and a Kish grid was used to randomize respondents within each selected household. Sampled respondents were gender-matched to enumerators, in keeping with local gender norms. Where weather-induced transportation issues (e.g., flooding) or threats to enumerator safety meant ACSOR could not conduct random selection interviewing, intercept interviews were used to capture responses. Intercept interviews were conducted by male enumerators with male residents of inaccessible districts as they traveled through neighboring, accessible areas of the province.

To better understand how ANQAR was administered, I held several conversations with current or former employees of the contracting agency (NATO) and the implementing partner (ACSOR/D3 Systems). All individuals I spoke with had direct knowledge of ANQAR from time working on the project. Conversation partners included a chairman at ACSOR, a managing director at ACSOR, a project manager at ACSOR, and an operational analyst at NATO's Afghanistan Assessment Group. In all of these conversations, ANQAR staffers highlighted several best-practices they used in survey administration:

- ACSOR teams hired and trained enumerators in every province of Afghanistan. Training covered household and respondent selection, how to correctly record responses, culturally-sensitive interview methods, and secure storage of contact information. Once trained by provincial-level teams from ACSOR, enumerators were assigned to enumerate districts in their province of origin. Consequently, all enumerators spoke local languages in local dialects, and were knowledgeable of important local customs.

- After the sampling set was identified and before fielding each wave, ACSOR entered negotiations with elders in selected villages to secure permission for enumerators to operate. This locally-sensitive approach enabled enumerators to safely conduct fieldwork in areas of weak state reach.

- Under no circumstances were ACSOR enumeration teams accompanied by counterinsurgent or government personnel, including members of NATO, ANSF, ABF, ALP, or other security agencies.

- Field supervisors made note of political, social, or other newsworthy events that occurred during fielding and may have affected the survey. Where interviews may have been impacted, supervisors back-checked responses for quality assurance.

- After fielding, data were screened for keypunching errors. ACSOR randomly selected 10% of survey responses for duplicate entry. Double-punched questionnaires were compared to original questionnaires, and discrepancies were rectified.

- During the data processing phase, D3 examined all responses using a proprietary program called Hunter, which was built to search for patterns or anomalies in the data that may indicate an interview was not properly conducted by an interviewer. Hunter specifically conducted: (1) equality tests to compare interviews for similarities, grouped by interviewer, within sampling point and/or province; (2) "Don't Know" tests of the percentage of "Don't Know" responses for each enumerator; and (3) duplicate tests comparing cases across all interviewers and respondents to check for similarity rates. Across waves on average, fewer than 2.6% of all responses were removed by Hunter.

On behalf of NATO, ACSOR tracked rates of response, cooperation, and refusal for all waves from 16–40. Using these data and following Condra and Wright (2019), I conduct diagnostic tests. Encouragingly, the rate of response is high (mean = 83% across waves), the rate of cooperation is high (mean = 95% across waves), and the rate of refusal is low (mean = 3.7% across waves). These rates of non-contact, cooperation, and refusal are comparable to rates from well-known surveys like the General Social Survey (GSS) fielded in the US.

Table A-3: Coding Dependent Variables from ANQAR

Variable	Question	Coding (=1) if	Waves
ANSF is Discriminate	Do you think ANSF does enough to prevent the killing or injuring of civilians?	Yes, they do a lot	18–32
Willing to Report IED to ANSF	If you knew that an IED had been planted, how likely would you be to report it to the local security forces?	Somewhat or Very Likely	20–27
Government Most Responsible for Security	Who most brings security to your area?	National Police, National Army, NDS, Border Police, Other government agencies	2–32
Informal/Local Institutions Most Responsible for Security	Who most brings security to your area?	Shuras/Elders, Local Commanders (Neither Government Nor Insurgent), Malik, Wakeel, People Themselves	2–32
Identify Myself by My Nationality	How would you identify yourself first?	By my Nationality (an Afghan)	2–3, 21–22
Household Draws Monthly Income	Does your family currently have monthly income?	No	1–24
Dissatisfied With Employment Situation	How satisfied are you with the provision of Jobs/Employment?	Somewhat or Very Dissatisfied	28–32
Favorable View of Traffickers in My Area	How are those who run and profit from the drugs trade seen by others in your community?	Well or Very Well	2–24, 26
Local Notables Have Most Impact on Economy	Who has the most impact on reconstruction and development in your area?	Malik/Khan/Influential Persons, Local Commanders (Neither Government Nor Insurgent), Wakeel	11–27
Witnessed Police Behave Improperly	Have you heard of or seen the police in your mantaqa doing anything improper?	Yes	4–6, 8–13, 16–26
Experienced Police Corruption	Have you seen or personally experienced the police in your mantaqa committing corrupt behavior?	Yes	7, 10, 13, 16, 18, 21–23, 25, 27–32

Note: ANSF refers to the Afghan National Security Forces. IED refers to Improvised Explosive Devices. Mantaqa refers to a respondent's "area" or community.

B Identification Strategy

B.1 Violence Trends and Border Fortification

Columns 1-4 show that insurgent-initiated violence is uncorrelated with treatment onset. Columns 5-8 give a temporal placebo check, confirming contemporary border fortification does not predict past violence.

Table B-1: Violence Trends and Border Fortification

	Panel A: Violence Does Not Predict Treatment Onset				**Panel B: Fortification Does Not Predict Past Violence**			
	DV: Onset of Border Fortification				**DV: Trend in Lagged, Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs**			
	(1) 3 Month MA	(2) 6 Month MA	(3) 9 Month MA	(4) 12 Month MA	(5) 3 Month MA	(6) 6 Month MA	(7) 9 Month MA	(8) 12 Month MA
Trend in Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs	0.00001	-0.00002	-0.00002	-0.00000				
	(0.00074)	(0.00001)	(0.00002)	(0.00002)				
Border Fortification					0.09243	0.02889	0.04368	0.13264
					(0.07521)	(0.08068)	(0.09080)	(0.13914)
Observations	4688	4184	3443	2723	5180	4662	3885	3108
Adjusted R^2	0.155	0.271	0.188	0.270	0.805	0.876	0.933	0.968
AIC	-12006.322	-11048.479	-10206.083	-10073.082	8186.973	5032.671	1748.167	-922.781
Parameters								
District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-Specific Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pashto x Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Population	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: † p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Columns 1-4 study the probability of treatment (fortification) onset. MA = lagged moving average. Violence trends reflect per-capita trends in the respective header variable. The sample includes districts in border provinces.

B.2 ANQAR Estimation Strategy

For estimations studying ANQAR survey data as opposed to administrative data, the analogous estimating equation is:

$$Y_{i,d,t} = \delta(\text{Border Fortification}_{d,t-1}) + \alpha_d + \beta_t + \gamma(X_{i,d,t}) + \epsilon \quad \text{(B1)}$$

where i indexes respondents, d indexes districts, and t indexes year-specific quarters. $Y_{i,d,t}$ are ANQAR outcomes of interest, including perceptions of security and corruption. Border Fortification$_{d,t-1}$ denotes whether a district had a border fort in quarter $t-1$. α_d and β_t are district and year-specific quarter (i.e., survey wave) fixed effects. $X_{i,d,t}$ is a vector of individual-level covariates. ϵ are robust, district-clustered standard errors. Estimates are scaled using sampling weights.

B.3 Border Fortification Did Not Cause Other Policy Changes

In columns 1-2 I find no evidence that fortification increased spending under the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), a large community development program (Beath, Christia and Enikolopov, 2015). Columns 3-6 show no evidence of shifting NATO, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), or Afghan Local Police (ALP) deployments (Bate, 2023). Column 7 considers territorial control as assessed by ACSOR field staff (Wright, 2023), and finds no effect of fortification on control ratings. Finally, using data from Fetzer et al. (2021), I find no distinguishable relationship between fortification and each district's assigned security transition (column 8) or the time to each district's actual hand-over ceremony (column 9).

Table B-2: Fortification Did Not Cause Other Policy Changes

	NSP Aid Spending		NATO/ISAF Battalions		ANSF Presence	ALP Presence	Territorial Control	Security Transitions	
	(1) Extensive Margin (=1)	(2) Per 100k Pop.	(3) Extensive Margin (=1)	(4) Intensive Margin (#)	(5) Extensive Margin (=1)	(6) Extensive Margin (=1)	(7) 5-Point Scale	(8) Assigned Tranche	(9) Hand-Over Ceremony
Border Fortification	0.002	49036.615	0.017	-0.025	-0.010	-0.038	0.010	0.190	0.248
	(0.051)	(70582.377)	(0.024)	(0.154)	(0.036)	(0.054)	(0.131)	(0.144)	(0.185)
Observations	5180	5180	5180	5180	5180	5180	5180	3098	3534
Adjusted R^2	0.572	0.307	0.641	0.802	0.845	0.704	0.888		
Pseudo R^2								0.001	0.001
AIC	2115.138	142401.274	-6597.259	20264.465	-5364.815	-1282.478	6564.759	2368.645	2283.233
Parameters									
District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗
Year-Specific Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗
Pashto x Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	Cox PH	Cox PH

Note: † p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Columns 1-4 report OLS coefficients. Columns 5 and 6 report standardized coefficients from Cox proportional hazards models. The sample includes districts in border provinces.

B.4 Parallel Pre-Trends

The identifying assumption is that treated districts do not experience differential trends in outcomes. I follow the suggestion of Sun and Abraham (2021), and provide graphical evidence of parallel pre-trends using treatment leads in Figures B-1 – B-2. Eight leads (j) are included, where each lead represents a year-specific quarter before fortification. Hence, I study the period from 2 years prior (j_8) up until treatment onset (j_0). As recommended by Sun and Abraham (2021), I exclude two pre-policy periods as baselines: one period after the first lead (j_7) and one period before treatment onset (j_1).

I assess the impact of treatment leads by repeating the core, fully-saturated specifications from the main tables (e.g., Table 2). Leads of fortification give no indication of non-parallel pre-trends. I find consistent evidence of parallel pre-trends in individual-level analyses of ANQAR responses (Figure B-2).

Figure B-1: Pre-Trends in SIGACTs Outcomes



Note: Bars are 90 and 95% confidence intervals. The dashed red line marks 0. Solid gray lines denote omitted base periods at $t-7$ and $t-1$.



Note: Bars are 90 and 95% confidence intervals. The dashed red line marks 0. Solid gray lines denote omitted base periods at $t-7$ and $t-1$.



Note: Bars are 90 and 95% confidence intervals. The dashed red line marks 0. Solid gray lines denote omitted base periods at $t-7$ and $t-1$.

In Figure B-2, I take a similar approach to study pre-trends in ANQAR outcomes, assessing the impact of treatment leads in the full individual-level data. Eight leads (j) are included where possible, where each lead represents a year-specific quarter before fortification. Hence, I study the period from 2 years prior (j_8) up until treatment onset (j_0). For two outcomes—National Identification and Local Notables Most Impact Economy—there is insufficient data to study 8 pre-periods because the outcome was asked in a smaller number of rounds early or late in the fortification process. Consequently, for these questions there are fewer pre-treatment observations with relevant variation. For these outcomes I study 6 and 7 pre-periods respectively—the most possible in each case. For all outcomes I exclude two pre-policy periods as baselines: one period after the first lead and one period before treatment onset (j_1). I cannot plot pre-trends for the ANSF is discriminate, the willingness to report IED, or job dissatisfaction outcomes because I observe too few pre-treatment periods. Leads of fortification give no indication of non-parallel pre-trends.

Figure B-2: Pre-Trends in ANQAR Outcomes



Note: Bars are 90 and 95% confidence intervals. The dashed red line marks 0. Solid gray lines denote omitted base periods.

B.5 Spatial Extent of Counterinsurgent Operations

To study whether fortification increases the spatial extent of counterinsurgency, I overlay a shapefile of Afghan districts with 10km hexagonal grid cells. Next, I link SIGACTs event data to grid cells. For each district-quarter, I then calculate the standardized share of all district grid cells experiencing a relevant counterinsurgent-initiated SIGACT, filling the share measure with 0 when no grid cells in a district experience any government-initiated events. If fortification increases the share of all district grid cells experiencing a counterinsurgent-initiated mission in a given quarter, that suggests that it is expanding the geographic scope of government operations. In Table B-3 I study the geographic dispersion of legibility-building tactics and government security provision. Seven of nine outcomes are distinguishably increasing, with effect sizes ranging from 0.3–0.83 standard deviations (sd). Only two outcomes (counter-reconnaissance operations and detainees released) are not distinguishably increasing in geographic scope. Intuitively, these operations occur at or around fixed infrastructure sites—bases and detention centers respectively. Overall, the results suggest border fortification led to expanding government penetration of rural borderland communities.

Table B-3: Border Fortification and the Spatial Extent of Counterinsurgency

	Spatial Extent of Government-Initiated Events								
	Legibility-Building Operations						**Government Security Provision**		
	(1) Elder Shuras and Jirgas	(2) Surveillance Operations	(3) Counter-Reconnaissance Operations	(4) Arrests and Detentions	(5) Detainees Released	(6) Insurgents Reintegrated	(7) All Counterinsurgent Activities	(8) Police Actions	(9) Supportive Civilian Events
Border Fortification	0.298*	0.534*	0.085	0.355†	0.058	0.495†	0.571**	0.832†	0.390*
	(0.121)	(0.217)	(0.057)	(0.189)	(0.073)	(0.270)	(0.123)	(0.458)	(0.172)
Observations	5180	5180	5180	5180	5180	5180	5180	5180	5180
Adjusted R^2	0.189	0.298	0.095	0.632	0.093	0.217	0.280	0.200	0.135
AIC	15420.288	14956.012	11532.669	11764.701	17452.501	16563.793	14664.828	16423.718	16099.090
PARAMETERS									
District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-Specific Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pashto x Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Non-Government Control	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NATO Presence	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ANSF Presence	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ALP Presence	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
# of Grid Cells x Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: † p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01. See notes from Table 2.

B.6 Border Fortification and Government Employment

Afghan government agencies prioritized hiring local civilians when they established or expanded operations in a district (Smith, 2010*b*; Bate, 2023). Consequently, to validate that fortification led to increasing government presence, I study ANQAR survey data about respondents' self-reported occupations. Specifically, I consider respondents reports about employment in Afghan security forces or as low-/mid-tier government bureaucrats.

Table B-4: Border Fortification and Government Employment

	Full-Time Government Employee (=1)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Border Fortification	0.067**	0.066**	0.065**	0.065**	0.066**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Observations	73329	73329	73324	73242	73242
Adjusted R^2	0.021	0.098	0.098	0.099	0.099
AIC	-68994.051	-74964.935	-75001.814	-74965.426	-74975.743
PARAMETERS					
District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-Specific Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic Controls		✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity FE			✓	✓	✓
Security/Governance Controls				✓	✓
Survey Conditions Controls					✓

Note: † p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic controls are age and its squared term, gender, and education. Ethnicity fixed effects parameterize respondents' self-identified ethnic backgrounds. Security/governance controls are measures of economic status, indices of perceived performance of the national and district governments, indicators for the reported presence of police and military officials at least weekly, and perceived territorial control. Survey conditions controls are measures denoting a respondent's level of comfort and comprehension as assessed by the enumerator, along with the number of other people present during the interview. The sample includes districts in border provinces. Estimates are scaled using sampling weights.

C Robustness of Main Results

C.1 Border Fortification, Selectivity, and Informing

I explore the attitudinal side of civilian informing using survey data from ANQAR. Table C-1 suggests fortification increased perceived selectivity of government counterinsurgency and willingness to report IEDs. I do not anticipate an effect of fortification on the ability of NATO/ISAF or insurgent forces, neither of which saw their information-gathering abilities improved by border fortification. Moreover, fortification only exposed borderland civilians to greater Afghan (but not ISAF) counterinsurgent presence. As a placebo check, Table C-2 explores whether border fortification impacted the perceived discrimination of NATO/ISAF or insurgent violence. Encouragingly, I find that the positive effect of border fortification on perceived selectivity of violence is specific to Afghan government forces.

Table C-1: Border Fortification, Government Discrimination, and Collaboration

	ANSF is Discriminate (=1)					**Willing to Report IED to ANSF (=1)**				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Border Fortification	0.148**	0.142**	0.142**	0.087**	0.096**	0.309**	0.311**	0.311**	0.169**	0.167**
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Observations	109175	109175	109171	71876	71876	57956	57955	57954	57861	57861
Adjusted R^2	0.082	0.084	0.084	0.114	0.118	0.081	0.086	0.086	0.135	0.136
AIC	141176.880	140918.263	140838.848	89770.749	89434.124	60895.043	60566.292	60529.508	57213.162	57175.251
PARAMETERS										
District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-Specific Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic Controls		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity FE			✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓
Security/Governance Controls				✓	✓				✓	✓
Survey Conditions Controls					✓					✓

Note: † p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic controls are age and its squared term, gender, and education. Ethnicity fixed effects parameterize respondents' self-identified ethnic backgrounds. Security/governance controls are measures of economic status, indices of perceived performance of the national and district governments, indicators for the reported presence of police and military officials at least weekly, and perceived territorial control. Survey conditions controls are measures denoting a respondent's level of comfort and comprehension as assessed by the enumerator, along with the number of other people present during the interview. The sample includes districts in border provinces. Estimates are scaled using sampling weights.

Table C-2: Border Fortification and Placebo Selectivity

	ISAF is Discriminate (=1)					**Insurgents are Discriminate (=1)**				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Border Fortification	0.006	0.004	0.004	0.008	0.008	0.016	0.015	0.014	0.011	0.011
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Observations	145134	145134	145129	122229	122229	158259	158259	158255	120495	120495
Adjusted R^2	0.038	0.038	0.039	0.048	0.049	0.069	0.070	0.070	0.079	0.079
AIC	125689.671	125612.118	125450.382	102140.600	101987.827	42318.233	42139.094	42066.912	34791.248	34785.692
PARAMETERS										
District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-Specific Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic Controls		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity FE			✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓
Security/Governance Controls				✓	✓				✓	✓
Survey Conditions Controls					✓					✓

Note: † p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01. See notes from Table C-1.

C.2 Border Fortification and Government Security Provision

To the extent border fortification facilitates greater government involvement in security, this should manifest in increasing civilian reliance on government versus informal actors for protection. Table C-3 shows fortification symmetrically improved civilian perceptions of government security responsibility, and reduced perceptions that informal, local institutions contributed most to security. Increasing civilian reliance on government security provision is likely to be complimented by growing confidence in government security forces and trust in government communications aimed at the local populace. To explore this implication, I study two additional questions. To assesses confidence in government forces: "Please tell me if you are confident or not confident in the following institutions: Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)." I code confidence if respondents indicated that they were Somewhat or Very Confident. Belief in government messaging is proxied by the following question: "In general, do you think the statements made by the central government in Kabul are accurate about what the government is doing?" I code perceived accuracy if respondents noted they believed government messaging was Somewhat or Very Accurate.

Table C-3: Border Fortification and Government Security Provision

	Government Most Responsible for Security (=1)					**Informal/Local Institutions Most Responsible for Security (=1)**				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Border Fortification	0.058*	0.057*	0.058*	0.063*	0.063*	-0.063**	-0.062**	-0.063**	-0.068**	-0.068**
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Observations	214041	214041	214037	174485	174485	214041	214041	214037	174485	174485
Adjusted R^2	0.076	0.078	0.079	0.104	0.104	0.076	0.077	0.078	0.090	0.090
AIC	288726.862	288196.918	287933.468	228190.428	228192.655	278087.203	277722.672	277498.966	220640.380	220629.668
PARAMETERS										
District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-Specific Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic Controls		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity FE			✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓
Security/Governance Controls				✓	✓				✓	✓
Survey Conditions Controls					✓					✓

Note: † p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01. See notes from Table C-1.

Table C-4: Border Fortification and Confidence/Trust in Government

	Confident in the ANSF (=1)					**Government Messaging is Accurate and Truthful (=1)**				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Border Fortification	0.185**	0.179**	0.170**	0.188**	0.193**	0.440**	0.444**	0.443**	0.304**	0.303**
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Observations	58379	58378	58374	58308	58308	43416	43416	43412	28349	28349
Adjusted R^2	0.126	0.130	0.130	0.209	0.209	0.070	0.071	0.071	0.131	0.133
AIC	66201.249	65987.070	65904.014	60316.331	60253.490	57303.514	57254.155	57206.268	33613.825	33573.595
PARAMETERS										
District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-Specific Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic Controls		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity FE			✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓
Security/Governance Controls				✓	✓				✓	✓
Survey Conditions Controls					✓					✓

Note: † p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01. See notes from Table C-1.

C.3 Fortification, National Identity, and Tribal Patronage

In Table C-5 I show that fortification-induced improvements in perceptions of government security provision also translated to social identification with the central state.

Table C-5: Border Fortification and National Identification

	Identify Myself by My Nationality (=1)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Border Fortification	0.113†	0.114†	0.116†	0.112†	0.115†
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.066)
Observations	19687	19685	19683	19196	19196
Adjusted R^2	0.108	0.108	0.109	0.110	0.112
AIC	24186.998	24179.548	24149.121	23625.078	23583.064
PARAMETERS					
District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-Specific Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic Controls		✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity FE			✓	✓	✓
Security/Governance Controls				✓	✓
Survey Conditions Controls					✓

Note: † p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01. See notes from Table C-1.

In Figure C-1, I explore whether this effect is greater among respondents affiliated through tribal ties to President Hamid Karzai. In particular, I consider heterogeneity on the basis of membership in a ruling tribe, defined as superordinate tribes of the Durrani confederation (Barfield, 2010): the Popalzai, Sadozai, Barakzai, and Mohammadzai. Together, every head of state of Afghanistan from 1747–1992 and from 2002–2014 belonged to one of these tribes. Crucially, the ruling tribes have a long history of connection to the central Afghan state. I find that border fortification had a distinguishably greater effect on national identification among respondents connected through tribal affiliation to the central state.

Figure C-1: Fortification, Tribal Patronage, and National Identity



Note: Bars are 90 and 95% confidence intervals. Estimates represent the average marginal effect of border fortification on national identification for respondents with and without ties to historical ruling tribes.

C.4 Border Fortification and Economic Welfare

Table C-8 considers negative economic consequences of border fortification, focusing specifically on household income and satisfaction with labor market conditions. In Table C-6 I consider related labor market outcomes from ANQAR. Specifically, I study respondent self-reports that they were employed full-time, part-time, or unemployed (but not students, retirees, or housewives). Border fortification reduced reported full-time employment, and increased reported part-time employment but not unemployment. This suggests that the main impact of border fortification was a reduction in working hours, which caused substitution from full-time to part-time employment. Notably, Calì and Miaari (2018) find a similar effect in Palestine resulting from Israeli border fortification.

Table C-6: Border Fortification and Reduction in Working-Time

	Employed Full-Time (=1)					Employed Part-Time (=1)					Unemployed (=1)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Border Fortification	-0.193**	-0.177**	-0.177**	-0.185**	-0.184**	0.177**	0.181**	0.188**	0.195**	0.195**	0.002	0.004	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Observations	73331	73331	73326	73244	73244	73331	73331	73326	73244	73244	73331	73331	73326	73244	73244
Adjusted R^2	0.121	0.362	0.362	0.364	0.364	0.071	0.156	0.157	0.158	0.158	0.054	0.099	0.100	0.101	0.101
AIC	87591.123	64099.076	64033.915	63770.452	63743.182	64154.827	57035.477	56975.914	56803.565	56799.608	17601.895	13954.312	13902.181	13717.117	13698.275
Parameters															
District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-Specific Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic Controls		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity FE			✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓
Security/Governance Controls				✓	✓				✓	✓				✓	✓
Survey Conditions Controls					✓					✓					✓

Note: † p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01. See notes from Table C-1.

In Figure C-2, I examine variation in the labor market effect of border fortification across occupational sectors. Average reductions in full-time employment in fortified communities were driven primarily by reductions in full-time agricultural or unskilled employment—the sectors most reliant on informal cross-border markets (Sahill, 2021). Overall reductions in full-time employment were partially offset by increasing full-time public sector employment (Figure B-4).

Figure C-2: Fortification and Full-Time Employment by Occupational Sector

Note: Bars are 90 and 95% confidence intervals.

C.5 Border Fortification and Illicit Economic Activity

One concern with results in Table 6 is that increasing incidence of illicit economic acitivites merely reflects increasing observability of crime stemming from border fortification. It is possible that by expanding government presence, fortification increases detection of economic crimes, but not their actual incidence. In Figure C-3 I examine all categories of crimes from the SIGACTs data, including violent crimes (murder, arson, assault), economic crimes (smuggling, illicit finance, ransom kidnapping), and other unspecified crimes. If fortification merely increased observability of crime in general, it should increase reports of all categories of crimes. Instead, I find the effect is *specific* to the economic crimes considered in Table 6.

Figure C-3: Fortification and Criminal SIGACTs



Note: Bars are 90 and 95% confidence intervals. Specfications follow Table 6.

C.6 Border Fortification and Opium Poppy Cultivation

Cultivation of opium poppy is the most important illicit livelihood activity in the Afghan borderlands, contributing as much as 30% of GDP (Mansfield, 2016). Reliable data on economic productivity in Afghanistan is sparse, and changes in economic activity at the district level are particularly difficult to measure. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime's (UNODC) Opium Survey is one of the most important sources for estimating illicit economic activity in Afghanistan. As described in Sonin and Wright (2023), UNODC officials estimate opium poppy cultivation across district-years in Afghanistan using a combination of remote-sensing data and field verification. In Table C-7 I use district-year data from UNODC surveys to examine whether border fortification is associated with changes in cultivation of opium poppy. To the extent illicit economic entrepreneurs resist fortification-induced economic dislocation by resorting to criminal economic activities, border fortification should be associated with increasing poppy cultivation. Because not all border regions of Afghanistan are agro-climatically suitable for poppy harvesting, I also consider the marginal effect of border fortification in districts with more favorable historical (pre-treatment) growing conditions. I measure historical poppy suitability using pre-treatment data (2006–2008) from Sonin and Wright (2023), who estimate local, poppy-growing season conditions using granular agro-climatic data. I find that border fortification is positively correlated with opium poppy cultivation, and this effect is large and distinguishable in districts with more favorable growing-season conditions. Substantively, fortification increased cultivation 84–117% in suitable districts.

Table C-7: Border Fortification and Opium Poppy Cultivation

	DV: Log(Hectares of Opium Poppy Cultivation + 1)						
	Baseline	Heterogeneity by Historical Growing-Season Conditions					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Border Fortification	0.141	0.051	0.072	0.060	0.010	-0.001	-0.127
	(0.222)	(0.233)	(0.210)	(0.212)	(0.194)	(0.191)	(0.185)
Border Fortification x Poppy Suitability		0.670*	0.623*	0.631*	0.615*	0.609†	0.776†
		(0.276)	(0.303)	(0.297)	(0.305)	(0.318)	(0.409)
Observations	1554	1554	1554	1554	1554	1554	1554
Adjusted R^2	0.868	0.869	0.874	0.874	0.874	0.874	0.879
AIC	4428.852	4428.799	4356.832	4354.014	4339.443	4331.683	4271.604
Parameters							
District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pashto x Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Non-Government Control	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NATO Presence	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ANSF Presence	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ALP Presence	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ruggedness			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Market Access				✓	✓	✓	✓
Irrigation					✓	✓	✓
Arable Land						✓	✓
Price Region Trends							✓

Note: † p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Non-government control is an indicator for insurgent-controlled districts. NATO presence is the number of NATO/ISAF battalions in a district. ANSF presence is an indicator for the existence of an Afghan National Security Force base in a district. ALP presence is an indicator for Afghan Local Police operating in a district. Ruggedness is the inverse hyperbolic sine of the standard deviation of elevation in a district. Market access is an indicator for existence of a pretreatment highway in a district. Irrigation is an indicator for pretreatment intensity of irrigation in a district. Arable land is the share of land in a district suitable for agriculture. Price region trends are linear time-trends for the three largest opium-producing, farmgate-price regions in Afghanistan. The sample includes districts in border provinces. Estimates are scaled using analytic population weights.

C.7 Reliance on Informal Economic Elites

Table C-8: Border Fortification and Informal Economic Elites

	Favorable View of Traffickers in My Area (=1)					Local Notables Have Most Impact on Economy (=1)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Border Fortification	0.024†	0.023†	0.024†	0.023†	0.022†	0.027**	0.026**	0.026**	0.025**	0.025**
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Observations	162407	162407	162407	160330	160330	126354	126354	126353	125384	125384
Adjusted R^2	0.071	0.072	0.072	0.079	0.080	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.028
AIC	24047.957	23963.908	23869.454	21858.731	21703.590	-59841.737	-59842.836	-59881.533	-59222.919	-59248.315
Parameters										
District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-Specific Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic Controls		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity FE			✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓
Security/Governance Controls				✓	✓				✓	✓
Survey Conditions Controls					✓					✓

Note: † p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01. See notes from Table C-1.

To complement the analyses in Table 6, I consider question from ANQAR about perceptions of informal and illicit economic actors. In columns 1-5 I study civilian perceptions of drug traffickers, who facilitate an illicit but widespread livelihood activity in the Afghan borderlands. In columns 6-10 I consider a related outcome—who civilians believe has the biggest impact on the economy and development in their community. I focus on beliefs around a category of local notables. In Afghanistan, village-level governance is organized around *maliks* and *khans* (Barfield, 2010; Murtazashvili, 2016). Maliks are headmen, or influential elders

occupying a primus inter pares position in village-level councils; khans are large landholders. These local notables are responsible for representing and protecting village interests, and serve as interlocutors between civilians, government officials, and militants. Qualitative evidence suggests that these elites resisted state efforts that impinged on local economic interests (Morgan, 2021, p. 78-87). Estimates lend credence to this phenomenon more generally. Border fortification increased the perceived importance of local notables for the village economy.

C.8 Border Fortification, Smuggling, and Corruption

In Table C-9 I examine heterogeneity in the effect of border fortification on corruption by access to smuggling networks. To do so, I code the locations of major, illicit narcotics markets and trans-shipment centers across Afghanistan. I specifically rely on maps provided by the UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2008, 2009), which code the locations of opium and cannabis transit hubs formed pre-treatment rather than as an endogenous response to border enforcement. Opium and cannabis are the two most important crops in the illicit cultivation economy that prevails in the Afghan borderlands (Mansfield, 2016). Interacting border fortification with a cross-sectional indicator for these nodes reveals that border fortification increased official corruption to a greater degree in trafficking hubs.

Figure C-4: Geography of Smuggling in Afghanistan



Note: The map depicts traditional trafficking hubs across districts in Afghanistan.

Table C-9: Border Fortification, Smuggling, and Corruption

	Witnessed Police Behave Improperly (=1)						Experienced Police Corruption (=1)					
	Baseline	Heterogeneity by Trafficking					Baseline	Heterogeneity by Trafficking				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Border Fortification	0.046*	0.033	0.033	0.034	0.029	0.029	0.093**	0.070*	0.073**	0.073**	0.059†	0.058†
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Border Fortification x Trafficking Hub		0.081*	0.073*	0.071*	0.069*	0.068*		0.111**	0.095**	0.094**	0.140**	0.140**
		(0.037)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)		(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Observations	139251	140417	140417	140417	139251	139251	71720	109489	109489	109485	71720	71720
Adjusted R^2	0.153	0.112	0.119	0.120	0.153	0.153	0.149	0.098	0.106	0.106	0.149	0.150
AIC	121231.654	128774.069	127587.345	127533.159	121269.464	121211.178	65639.939	112675.739	111669.626	111614.670	65653.734	65607.657
Parameters												
District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-Specific Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic Controls	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity FE	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓
Security/Governance Controls	✓				✓	✓	✓				✓	✓
Survey Conditions Controls	✓					✓	✓					✓

Note: † p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01. See notes from Table C-1.

C.9 Border Fortification and Social Unrest

Administrative data from the SIGACTs dataset record information on two types of social strife: tribal feuds and demonstrations. Combined, these events respectively characterize contentious disputes between organized tribal groups, and protests. I combine these indicators into a measure of rural unrest, which captures social strife in peripheral borderland communities. Fortification increases rural social conflict.

Table C-10: Border Fortification and Social Unrest

	Rural Unrest		**Tribal Feuds**		**Demonstrations**	
	(1) Extensive Margin (=1)	(2) Per 100k Capita	(3) Extensive Margin (=1)	(4) Per 100k Capita	(5) Extensive Margin (=1)	(6) Per 100k Capita
Border Fortification	0.091*	0.159**	0.034*	0.058*	0.055	0.101*
	(0.042)	(0.060)	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.050)
Observations	5180	5180	5180	5180	5180	5180
Adjusted R^2	0.184	0.110	0.077	0.066	0.211	0.109
AIC	650.173	8343.902	-4854.316	1961.290	-890.362	5877.171
PARAMETERS						
District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-Specific Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pashto x Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Non-Government Control	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NATO Presence	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ANSF Presence	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ALP Presence	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: † p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01. See notes from Table 2.

C.10 Intensive Margin of Border Fortification

The core models study the extensive margin of fortification, which averages over substantive, scale effects in the intensive margin of border fortification. To examine these, I re-estimate the focal regressions while focusing on the number of border fortifications in a district. The main results are generally robust.

Figure C-5: Number of Border Forts in Afghanistan



Note: The map depicts the number of border forts across districts in Afghanistan.

Table C-11: Intensive Margin of Border Fortification

	Effect of # of Border Fortifications				Effect of # of Border Fortifications		
Dependent Variable:	Coefficient	Std. Error	P-Value	**Dependent Variable:**	Coefficient	Std. Error	P-Value
Elder Shuras and Jirgas (=1)	0.048*	0.022	0.028	All Counterinsurgent Activities (=1)	0.103**	0.038	0.007
Elder Shuras and Jirgas (Per 100k Pop.)	0.158†	0.083	0.058	All Counterinsurgent Activities (Per 100k Pop.)	0.563**	0.174	0.001
Surveillance Operations (=1)	0.061†	0.031	0.052	Police Actions (=1)	0.053**	0.020	0.008
Surveillance Operations (Per 100k Pop.)	0.368*	0.151	0.015	Police Actions (Per 100k Pop.)	0.043**	0.012	0.001
Counter-Reconnaissance Operations (=1)	0.024	0.016	0.137	Supportive Civilian Events (=1)	0.047**	0.014	0.001
Counter-Reconnaissance Operations (Per 100k Pop.)	0.074†	0.040	0.069	Supportive Civilian Events (Per 100k Pop.)	0.060**	0.018	0.001
Arrests and Detentions (=1)	0.063	0.043	0.146	All Smuggling (=1)	0.053	0.036	0.142
Arrests and Detentions (Per 100k Pop.)	1.033**	0.358	0.004	All Smuggling (Per 100k Pop.)	0.282*	0.131	0.032
Detainees Released (=1)	-0.002	0.018	0.853	Narcotics Smuggling (=1)	0.040	0.026	0.130
Detainees Released (Per 100k Pop.)	-0.004	0.012	0.719	Narcotics Smuggling (Per 100k Pop.)	0.086†	0.051	0.095
Insurgents Reintegrated (=1)	0.111**	0.029	0.000	Arms Smuggling (=1)	0.068†	0.035	0.054
Insurgents Reintegrated (Per 100k Pop.)	0.209**	0.051	0.000	Arms Smuggling (Per 100k Pop.)	0.193*	0.086	0.025
Tips: All Violent Threats (=1)	0.039	0.029	0.188	Illicit Finance (=1)	0.029	0.031	0.361
Tips: All Violent Threats (Per 100k Pop.)	0.059	1.594	0.970	Illicit Finance (Per 100k Pop.)	0.097	0.060	0.105
Tips: Explosive Threats (=1)	0.081*	0.033	0.015	Ransom Kidnapping (=1)	0.053†	0.031	0.094
Tips: Explosive Threats (Per 100k Pop.)	0.830	0.557	0.138	Ransom Kidnapping (Per 100k Pop.)	0.079	0.065	0.225
Tips: Threats Against Civilians (=1)	0.076†	0.043	0.082	Rural Unrest (=1)	0.046*	0.022	0.036
Tips: Threats Against Civilians (Per 100k Pop.)	0.236*	0.100	0.019	Rural Unrest (Per 100k Pop.)	0.089**	0.033	0.008
Explosive Hazards Found/Cleared (=1)	0.039	0.029	0.172	Tribal Feuds (=1)	0.017†	0.009	0.050
Explosive Hazards Found/Cleared (Per 100k Pop.)	3.369**	1.145	0.004	Tribal Feuds (Per 100k Pop.)	0.036*	0.017	0.032
Weapons Caches Found/Cleared (=1)	0.031	0.028	0.267	Demonstrations (=1)	0.028†	0.017	0.090
Weapons Caches Found/Cleared (Per 100k Pop.)	1.048*	0.532	0.050	Demonstrations (Per 100k Pop.)	0.053*	0.026	0.039
ANSF is Discriminate (=1)	0.060	0.037	0.102	Household Draws Monthly Income (=1)	-0.017*	0.008	0.037
Willing to Report IED (=1)	0.279**	0.051	0.000	Dissatisfied With Employment Situation (=1)	-0.014	0.011	0.228
Government Most Responsible for Security (=1)	0.035*	0.015	0.021	Favorable View of Traffickers in My Area (=1)	0.020*	0.008	0.013
Informal, Local Institutions Most Responsible for Security (=1)	-0.033**	0.012	0.008	Local Notables Have Most Impact on Economy (=1)	0.012**	0.004	0.002
Identify Myself By My Nationality (=1)	0.008	0.027	0.760	Witnessed Police Impropriety (=1)	0.026*	0.012	0.031
				Experienced Police Corruption (=1)	0.063**	0.022	0.004

Note: † p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The top panel includes parameters from Table 2. The bottom panel includes parameters from Table C-1. The sample includes districts in border provinces. Estimates are scaled using analytic population weights (top panel) or sampling weights (bottom panel).

C.11 Alternative Difference-in-Differences Estimators

Borusyak, Jaravel and Spiess (2022) propose an imputation estimator that fits district and year-specific quarter fixed effects using untreated observations, imputes untreated potential outcomes to obtain an estimated treatment effect for each treated observation, then calculates a weighted sum of these treatment effect estimates. Results using this alternative estimator are substantively similar.

Table C-12: Borusyak, Jaravel and Spiess (2022) Imputation Estimator

	Imputation Estimator				Imputation Estimator		
Dependent Variable:	Coefficient	Std. Error	P-Value	**Dependent Variable:**	Coefficient	Std. Error	P-Value
Elder Shuras and Jirgas (=1)	0.065*	0.030	0.033	All Counterinsurgent Activities (=1)	0.166**	0.043	0.000
Elder Shuras and Jirgas (Per 100k Pop.)	0.149	0.120	0.214	All Counterinsurgent Activities (Per 100k Pop.)	0.922**	0.168	0.000
Surveillance Operations (=1)	0.067*	0.028	0.016	Police Actions (=1)	0.038**	0.011	0.001
Surveillance Operations (Per 100k Pop.)	0.481**	0.102	0.000	Police Actions (Per 100k Pop.)	0.028†	0.014	0.051
Counter-Reconnaissance Operations (=1)	0.062*	0.028	0.024	Supportive Civilian Events (=1)	0.081**	0.029	0.005
Counter-Reconnaissance Operations (Per 100k Pop.)	0.057	0.038	0.129	Supportive Civilian Events (Per 100k Pop.)	0.107**	0.026	0.000
Arrests and Detentions (=1)	0.132*	0.053	0.013	All Smuggling (=1)	0.114**	0.030	0.000
Arrests and Detentions (Per 100k Pop.)	0.428	0.307	0.163	All Smuggling (Per 100k Pop.)	0.206*	0.089	0.020
Detainees Released (=1)	0.014	0.010	0.145	Narcotics Smuggling (=1)	0.056**	0.017	0.001
Detainees Released (Per 100k Pop.)	0.007	0.008	0.410	Narcotics Smuggling (Per 100k Pop.)	0.076*	0.030	0.012
Insurgents Reintegrated (=1)	0.176**	0.034	0.000	Arms Smuggling (=1)	0.103**	0.028	0.000
Insurgents Reintegrated (Per 100k Pop.)	0.374**	0.082	0.000	Arms Smuggling (Per 100k Pop.)	0.191**	0.065	0.003
Tips: All Violent Threats (=1)	0.240**	0.058	0.000	Illicit Finance (=1)	0.111†	0.062	0.071
Tips: All Violent Threats (Per 100k Pop.)	0.107	1.562	0.946	Illicit Finance (Per 100k Pop.)	0.147†	0.088	0.095
Tips: Explosive Threats (=1)	0.300**	0.065	0.000	Ransom Kidnapping (=1)	0.042	0.044	0.340
Tips: Explosive Threats (Per 100k Pop.)	1.042	0.736	0.157	Ransom Kidnapping (Per 100k Pop.)	0.072	0.065	0.270
Tips: Threats Against Civilians (=1)	0.057	0.043	0.182	Rural Unrest (=1)	0.078**	0.029	0.007
Tips: Threats Against Civilians (Per 100k Pop.)	0.116	0.098	0.234	Rural Unrest (Per 100k Pop.)	0.128**	0.034	0.000
Explosive Hazards Found/Cleared (=1)	-0.023	0.076	0.760	Tribal Feuds (=1)	0.029*	0.013	0.024
Explosive Hazards Found/Cleared (Per 100k Pop.)	2.191†	1.251	0.080	Tribal Feuds (Per 100k Pop.)	0.043**	0.015	0.004
Weapons Caches Found/Cleared (=1)	0.076**	0.026	0.004	Demonstrations (=1)	0.048*	0.022	0.029
Weapons Caches Found/Cleared (Per 100k Pop.)	0.544	0.657	0.407	Demonstrations (Per 100k Pop.)	0.086**	0.026	0.001
ANSF is Discriminate (=1)	0.278**	0.010	0.000	Household Draws Monthly Income (=1)	-0.033*	0.014	0.018
Willing to Report IED (=1)	0.591**	0.012	0.000	Dissatisfied With Employment Situation (=1)	0.355**	0.014	0.000
Government Most Responsible for Security (=1)	0.026	0.025	0.292	Favorable View of Traffickers in My Area (=1)	0.021*	0.010	0.031
Informal, Local Institutions Most Responsible for Security (=1)	-0.040†	0.024	0.098	Local Notables Have Most Impact on Economy (=1)	0.025**	0.005	0.000
Identify Myself By My Nationality (=1)	0.112**	0.029	0.000	Witnessed Police Impropriety (=1)	0.050**	0.018	0.005
				Experienced Police Corruption (=1)	0.096**	0.037	0.009

Note: † p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The top panel includes parameters from Table 2. The bottom panel includes parameters from Table C-1. The sample includes districts in border provinces. Estimates are scaled using analytic population weights (top panel) or sampling weights (bottom panel).

C.12 Temporal Dynamism

In Figures C-6 – C-7, I re-estimate the focal SIGACTs and ANQAR specifications with successively longer leads of outcomes vis-á-vis treatment. Formally, $\forall\ n\ \big(0, 1, 2, ...12\big)$ I estimate the following equation for administrative data outcomes:

$$Y_{d,t+n} = \delta(\text{Border Fortification}_{d,t}) + \alpha_d + \beta_t + \nu_{p\times t} + \gamma(X_{d,t}) + \epsilon$$

Similarly, $\forall\ n\ \big(0, 1, 2, ...8\big)$ I estimate the following equation for survey-based data outcomes:

$$Y_{i,d,t+n} = \delta(\text{Border Fortification}_{d,t}) + \alpha_d + \beta_t + \gamma(X_{i,d,t}) + \epsilon$$

National identification and dissatisfaction with employment conditions were asked in too few waves to meaningfully assess dynamic post-treatment variation. More generally, I study a smaller number of leads (8) for ANQAR outcomes than for administrative SIGACTs outcomes (12) because ANQAR questions were not asked in every round.

Results in Figure C-6 consider key security-related outcomes, while results in Figure C-7 study economic outcomes. In general, a dynamic trade-off emerges. The security benefits of border fortification mostly attenuate in three to five quarters after treatment. In contrast, negative economic consequences of fortification are more durable. Illicit revenue-generating activities like narcotic smuggling and ransom kidnapping remain extensive throughout the post-fortification period. Favorability toward traffickers becomes distinguishably positive two quarters after treatment, and remains so throughout the succeeding six quarters. Perceptions that local notables most impact the economy are higher for one year after fortification, but increase again later in the time series. Perceptions of police impropriety and corruption are large and positive throughout the post-treatment period, and distinguishably so for at least five post-treatment periods.

Figure C-6: Temporal Dynamism in Security Outcomes



Note: Bars are 90 and 95% confidence intervals. The dashed red line marks 0. Plots show coefficients from regressions of progressively longer leads of the respective outcome on border fortification. SIGACTs specifications follow Table 2 and ANQAR specifications follow Table C-1.

Figure C-7: Temporal Dynamism in Economic Outcomes



Note: Bars are 90 and 95% confidence intervals. The dashed red line marks 0. Plots show coefficients from regressions of progressively longer leads of the respective outcome on border fortification. SIGACTs specifications follow Table 2 and ANQAR specifications follow Table C-1.

C.13 Effects Different From Other Security Infrastructure

All of the core estimates are robust to controlling for territorial control and other forms of security infrastructure, including NATO presence, presence of non-ABF counterinsurgent forces attached to the ANSF, and presence of ALP troops. For SIGACTs outcomes, all models include these measures as covariates. For ANQAR outcomes, models controlling for these covariates are presented in Table C-13. Table C-14 reports F-statistics from Wald tests of the equality of coefficients. These tests examine *differences* between the effects of border fortification and effects of other forms of counterinsurgent presence (NATO, ANSF, ALP). Estimates are mostly specific to border fortification, reflecting the unique, legibility-building role ABF forces played in borderland communities.

Table C-13: Controlling for Other Security Infrastructure

	(1) ANSF Discriminate	(2) Report IED	(3) Govt. Brings Security	(4) Local Instit. Brings Security	(5) National Identity	(6) Monthly Income	(7) Job Dissatisfaction	(8) Favor Traffickers	(9) Impact Local Notables	(10) Police Improper	(11) Police Corrupt
Border Fortification	0.095**	0.169**	0.102**	-0.106**	0.102	-0.028†	0.161**	0.028*	0.026**	0.044*	0.091**
	(0.023)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.063)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.021)	(0.032)
Observations	71876	57861	153781	153781	19196	132134	37194	139740	125384	123090	71720
Adjusted R^2	0.119	0.136	0.109	0.092	0.114	0.074	0.246	0.084	0.028	0.153	0.150
AIC	89416.531	57160.654	199686.142	193881.206	23553.860	35799.434	41949.900	17823.464	-59257.019	107726.309	65594.429
Parameters											
District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-Specific Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Security/Governance Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Survey Conditions Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Non-Government Control	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NATO Presence	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ANSF Presence	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ALP Presence	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: † p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Non-government control is an indicator for insurgent-controlled districts. NATO presence is the number of NATO/ISAF battalions in a district. ANSF presence is an indicator for the existence of an Afghan National Security Force base in a district. ALP presence is an indicator for Afghan Local Police operating in a district. See notes from Table C-1. Some controls (e.g., ALP presence) are excluded in columns 5 and 7 because of covariate missingness in waves these outcome questions were asked.

Table C-14: Border Fortification Versus Other Security Infrastructure

	Difference from Effect of Border Fortification			
Dependent Variable:	Joint Difference	NATO Presence	ANSF Presence	ALP Presence
Elder Shuras and Jirgas (=1)	1.38	2.67	3.66†	0.19
Elder Shuras and Jirgas (Per 100k Pop.)	1.57	3.39†	0.93	0.00
Surveillance Operations (=1)	7.46**	16.00**	0.26	6.07*
Surveillance Operations (Per 100k Pop.)	6.99**	17.37**	2.69	1.53
Counter-Reconnaissance Operations (=1)	2.22†	4.20*	0.03	2.27
Counter-Reconnaissance Operations (Per 100k Pop.)	1.87	4.69*	0.11	1.89
Arrests and Detentions (=1)	3.51*	6.61*	0.93	8.81**
Arrests and Detentions (Per 100k Pop.)	3.19*	8.41**	7.61**	3.51†
Detainees Released (=1)	3.95**	11.31**	0.48	2.08
Detainees Released (Per 100k Pop.)	2.03	4.81*	0.00	2.23
Insurgents Reintegrated (=1)	14.84**	13.68**	16.24**	29.05**
Insurgents Reintegrated (Per 100k Pop.)	11.35**	14.83**	15.00**	28.44**
Tips: All Violent Threats (=1)	12.75**	4.22*	8.45**	20.80**
Tips: All Violent Threats (Per 100k Pop.)	1.75	0.05	0.37	2.32
Tips: Explosive Threats (=1)	8.83**	11.76**	11.48**	23.09**
Tips: Explosive Threats (Per 100k Pop.)	2.64†	4.22*	0.64	0.33
Tips: Threats Against Civilians (=1)	1.25	2.76†	1.56	3.73†
Tips: Threats Against Civilians (Per 100k Pop.)	1.68	4.13*	3.91*	3.23†
Explosive Hazards Found/Cleared (=1)	3.72*	2.74†	0.10	6.43*
Explosive Hazards Found/Cleared (Per 100k Pop.)	3.74*	10.93**	6.70*	6.09*
Weapons Caches Found/Cleared (=1)	1.99	4.62*	1.19	5.58*
Weapons Caches Found/Cleared (Per 100k Pop.)	1.66	3.57†	3.87†	2.09
ANSF is Discriminate (=1)	5.25**	14.67**	4.52*	6.84**
Willing to Report IED (=1)	48.92**	135.67**	16.71**	38.80**
Government Most Responsible for Security (=1)	4.14**	8.86**	2.21	9.00**
Informal, Local Institutions Most Responsible for Security (=1)	7.13**	13.15**	3.72†	16.92**
Identify Myself by My Nationality (=1)	10.03**	10.03**	—	—

	Difference from Effect of Border Fortification			
Dependent Variable:	Joint Difference	NATO Presence	ANSF Presence	ALP Presence
All Counterinsurgent Activities (=1)	4.08**	11.03**	5.60*	10.34**
All Counterinsurgent Activities (Per 100k Pop.)	8.82**	21.79**	9.65**	16.61**
Police Actions (=1)	2.20†	6.09*	6.03*	0.42
Police Actions (Per 100k Pop.)	3.40*	6.92**	6.22*	0.03
Supportive Civilian Events (=1)	6.29**	9.81**	7.47**	15.92**
Supportive Civilian Events (Per 100k Pop.)	5.71**	13.14**	5.28*	12.68**
All Smuggling (=1)	4.21**	4.68*	0.06	0.65
All Smuggling (Per 100k Pop.)	2.66*	4.93*	0.02	1.54
Narcotics Smuggling (=1)	2.12†	6.05*	2.72	2.26
Narcotics Smuggling (Per 100k Pop.)	2.25†	5.61*	0.48	2.16
Arms Smuggling (=1)	5.24**	5.96*	0.02	0.96
Arms Smuggling (Per 100k Pop.)	1.37	3.97*	1.12	1.43
Illicit Finance (=1)	1.53	3.33†	0.57	0.68
Illicit Finance (Per 100k Pop.)	1.55	2.77†	0.32	0.01
Ransom Kidnapping (=1)	3.32*	7.36**	1.79	8.89**
Ransom Kidnapping (Per 100k Pop.)	0.58	1.23	1.56	1.28
Rural Unrest (=1)	2.76*	5.13*	0.42	2.72
Rural Unrest (Per 100k Pop.)	2.52†	7.39**	3.68†	5.23*
Tribal Feuds (=1)	1.83	4.37*	1.67	0.84
Tribal Feuds (Per 100k Pop.)	1.93	5.16*	3.33†	4.62*
Demonstrations (=1)	1.99	3.26†	0.03	1.81
Demonstrations (Per 100k Pop.)	2.04	4.57*	1.27	2.60
Household Draws Monthly Income (=1)	2.69*	3.86†	0.15	7.22**
Dissatisfied With Employment Situation (=1)	143.21**	274.26**	27.81**	—
Favorable View of Traffickers (=1)	2.86*	7.07**	1.29	3.36†
Local Notables Have Most Impact on Economy (=1)	6.28**	16.74**	11.95**	6.15*
Witnessed Police Impropriety (=1)	5.07**	7.51**	0.88	0.25
Experienced Police Corruption (=1)	3.58*	8.76**	6.72*	3.78†

Note: † p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01. I explore differences between the effect of border fortification and the effects of NATO, ANSF, and ALP presence for each of the core outcome measures. Cells report F-statistics from each test. Estimates are calculated from the main specifications for each outcome. No difference is reported on NATO or ALP presence for the national identity outcome, or on ALP presence for the employment dissatisfaction outcome because of covariate missingness. The sample includes districts in border provinces. Estimates are scaled using analytic population weights (top panel) or sampling weights (bottom panel).

C.14 Accounting for Endogenous Parameters

Individual-level covariates in the ANQAR analyses capture respondent perceptions at the time of the interview, whereas the independent variable is a one-period lag of border fortification. This raises a natural concern about post-treatment bias. Following Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández (2020), for each endogenous parameter I take the average response in a district-wave, lag the district-average response by one period, and re-estimate the focal specifications, replacing each individual-level, contemporaneous endogenous parameter with the lagged, district-level equivalent. The core estimates are robust, though modestly imprecise in columns 5 and 6.

Table C-15: Accounting for Endogenous Parameters

	(1) ANSF Discriminate	(2) Report IED	(3) Govt. Brings Security	(4) Local Instit. Brings Security	(5) National Identity	(6) Monthly Income	(7) Job Dissatisfaction	(8) Favor Traffickers	(9) Impact Local Notables	(10) Police Improper	(11) Police Corrupt
Border Fortification	0.147**	0.148**	0.057*	-0.063**	0.113	-0.022	0.244**	0.024†	0.025**	0.041†	0.087*
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.075)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.022)	(0.034)
Observations	76493	56023	165080	165080	18329	137289	37234	144614	114995	128906	72353
Adjusted R^2	0.081	0.089	0.082	0.082	0.114	0.080	0.072	0.073	0.027	0.121	0.118
AIC	98876.334	58194.694	220157.838	211150.731	22497.685	58815.043	49690.309	20951.162	-51999.720	117137.925	70143.712
Parameters											
District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-Specific Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Security/Governance Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Survey Conditions Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: † p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. See notes from Table C-1.

C.15 Border Fortification and Cluster Mean Perceptions

Treatment—in this case border fortification—is assigned at the cluster level—in this case the district. Clustered assignment to treatment means the precision of individual-level ANQAR analyses may be artificially-inflated. A more conservative approach is to analyze the data by cluster means (McCauley and Posner, 2015). To do so, I take the district-quarter average for each of the core outcomes I study from ANQAR. Then, I re-estimate the focal specifications in a least-squares equation at the district-quarter level. The core estimates are robust, though imprecise in column 10.

Table C-16: Border Fortification and Cluster Mean Perceptions

	(1) ANSF Discriminate	(2) Report IED	(3) Govt. Brings Security	(4) Local Instit. Brings Security	(5) National Identity	(6) Monthly Income	(7) Job Dissatisfaction	(8) Favor Traffickers	(9) Impact Local Notables	(10) Police Improper	(11) Police Corrupt
Border Fortification	0.132**	0.189**	0.080**	-0.085**	0.117†	-0.037*	0.246**	0.030**	0.021**	0.016	0.103**
	(0.042)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.070)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.031)	(0.036)
Observations	3192	1597	4873	4873	520	3107	1153	3307	3121	3065	2986
Adjusted R^2	0.405	0.381	0.386	0.417	0.416	0.238	0.349	0.302	0.338	0.476	0.450
AIC	-2687.492	-1867.990	-3889.617	-4636.557	-751.147	-4430.667	-1294.180	-5983.021	-10929.833	-3423.525	-3362.703
Parameters											
District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-Specific Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pashto x Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Non-Government Control	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NATO Presence	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ANSF Presence	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ALP Presence	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: † p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Covariates are described in notes from Table 2. Estimates are scaled by analytic weights for the number of ANQAR respondents in each district-wave. The sample includes districts in border provinces. Covariates for non-government control and NATO and ALP presence omitted in column 5 because missingness in these covariates renders the sample size too small. ALP presence is omitted in column 7 for the same reason.

C.16 Exploring Heterogeneity in the Effect of Fortification

Does the effect of border fortification vary geographically? I explore this possibility in Table C-17, where I consider whether and how the effect of border fortification varies across regional commands and neighboring countries. Afghanistan was divided into five regional commands within which NATO/ISAF forces operated. Effects were greatest in RC-East and RC-South, along the border with Pakistan. Economic backlash was also significant in border regions near Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. In results available upon request I also consider heterogeneity by gender, ethnicity, and territorial control. In these supplemental estimates, little distinguishable heterogeneity emerges. Ethnic parochialism could mean that shared kinship ties between the (primarily Pashtun) ABF and Pashtun respondents improved the positive effects of border fortification, while minimizing opposition. Instead, like Karim (2020) I find that the effect of co-ethnicity with police on relational state-building was generally weak. Among women respondents and across varying levels of district territorial control, I also find little evidence that the effect of border fortification varied.

Table C-17: Heterogeneity by Country and Regional Command

	(1) ANSF Discriminate	(2) Report IED	(3) Govt. Brings Security	(4) Local Instit. Brings Security	(5) National Identity	(6) Monthly Income	(7) Job Dissatisfaction	(8) Favor Traffickers	(9) Impact Local Notables	(10) Police Improper	(11) Police Corrupt
Border Fortification x Pakistan	0.096**	0.167**	0.063*	-0.069**	0.207*	-0.043**	0.163**	0.011	0.022**	0.026	0.069†
	(0.023)	(0.011)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.085)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.037)
Border Fortification x Tajikistan	—	—	0.116**	-0.146**	0.035	-0.055†	—	0.028**	—	0.053	-0.094
	—	—	(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.069)	(0.029)	—	(0.009)	—	(0.063)	(0.110)
Border Fortification x Turkmenistan	—	—	-0.038	0.021	0.090†	0.042*	—	0.024†	-0.022**	0.123**	0.149**
	—	—	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.047)	(0.019)	—	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.025)	(0.036)
Border Fortification x Iran	—	—	0.153**	-0.117*	-0.206†	-0.048	—	0.040	0.053**	-0.041	0.076†
	—	—	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.106)	(0.033)	—	(0.033)	(0.003)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Observations	71876	57861	174485	174485	19196	152577	37194	160330	125384	139251	71720
Adjusted R^2	0.118	0.136	0.104	0.091	0.114	0.090	0.246	0.080	0.028	0.153	0.150
AIC	89434.124	57175.251	228130.581	220576.012	23557.654	65203.733	41947.487	21685.875	-59246.072	121197.956	65593.463
PARAMETERS											
District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-Specific Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Security/Governance Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Survey Conditions Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

	(1) ANSF Discriminate	(2) Report IED	(3) Govt. Brings Security	(4) Local Instit. Brings Security	(5) National Identity	(6) Monthly Income	(7) Job Dissatisfaction	(8) Favor Traffickers	(9) Impact Local Notables	(10) Police Improper	(11) Police Corrupt
Border Fortification x RC-East	0.111**	—	0.067*	-0.071**	0.217*	-0.043**	—	0.010	0.021**	0.026	0.067†
	(0.015)	—	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.089)	(0.013)	—	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.021)	(0.037)
Border Fortification x RC-South	-0.033**	0.167**	0.020	-0.066	-0.059	-0.094†	—	0.057	0.073**	0.009	0.334**
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.133)	(0.049)	—	(0.071)	(0.003)	(0.087)	(0.011)
Border Fortification x RC-West	—	—	0.136**	-0.109**	-0.134	-0.011	—	0.059	0.034**	0.057	0.200**
	—	—	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.124)	(0.038)	—	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.053)	(0.028)
Border Fortification x RC-North	—	—	0.011	-0.039	0.085*	-0.014	0.163**	0.023**	—	0.088*	0.060
	—	—	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.030)	(0.013)	(0.006)	—	(0.035)	(0.080)
Observations	71876	57861	174485	174485	19196	152577	37194	160330	125384	139251	71720
Adjusted R^2	0.118	0.136	0.104	0.090	0.114	0.090	0.246	0.080	0.028	0.153	0.149
AIC	89435.063	57175.251	228163.627	220624.572	23553.810	65235.101	41947.487	21688.535	-59246.590	121219.693	65616.610
PARAMETERS											
District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-Specific Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Security/Governance Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Survey Conditions Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: † p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01. Robust standard errors clustered by district are in parentheses. See notes from Table C-1. Estimates are excluded where there is not relevant variation in border fortification within a neighboring country/regional command and survey wave.

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