

*Supplementary Materials* for  
**Historical Analogies and Public Support for  
Foreign Policy Action**

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## A Operationalizing Causal Mechanisms

To gauge respondents' perceptions about whether a foreign policy is likely to be successful, we create an index measure based on several different types of questions. Since success is multidimensional, a multi-question index is likely to provide a more comprehensive and accurate measure. First, in all studies, we ask a very broad question about whether respondents believe the policy will generally be successful: "How likely is it that President Richards' chosen policy in the scenario you read above will lead to a successful outcome for the United States?" This enables respondents to mentally define success in whatever manner they believe is most appropriate. Second, we ask a question designed to measure situation-specific perceptions of success, or what might be called tactical success. For example, in the scenario where China builds a military base in Panama, we ask whether "President Richards' chosen policy in the scenario you read above will force China to dismantle its military base in Panama." For the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar scenario, we ask, "How likely is it that President Richards' chosen policy in the scenario you read above will save thousands of innocent lives in a timely manner?" Finally, we ask respondents to assess the longer-term impacts of the president's foreign policy decision, which might be considered a measure of strategic success. For example, for the China scenarios in Studies 1 and 3, we ask, "How likely is it that the President's policy will help prevent China from overtaking the United States as the world's most powerful and influential country?" The index measures load well together, as the Cronbach's alpha measure of reliability averages over 0.80 across the three studies.

We operationalize our cost-benefit mechanism hypothesis with a three-question index measure asking to what extent respondents agree or disagree with each statement. First, we ask about the perceived costs of the president's policy in isolation: "The cost of President Richards' chosen policy are high." Second, we ask about the perceived benefits of the president's policy in isolation: "The benefits of President Richards' chosen policy are high." Third, we put these two together and ask: "The benefits of President Richards' chosen policy outweigh the costs." Since costs and benefits can be independent factors (e.g., a conflict, such as the Vietnam War, could have high costs but low benefits, or a conflict, such as the Falklands War, could have low costs but arguably high benefits), it is valuable to ask about each separately and then also assess how respondents weigh the costs versus the benefits. Given this discussion, it is no surprise that these three questions are less correlated than the ones above about success. Consequently, the average Cronbach's alpha across the three studies is positive, but lower than for the success measures: 0.48.

We test our hypothesized morality mechanism with a single, straightforward question: "In this scenario, the United States has a moral obligation to intervene to [prevent China from conquering Taiwan / prevent China from building a base in Panama / protect the Rohingya from being killed / prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability]."

Finally, to test our leader traits mechanism hypothesis, we again create a three-question index measure. We ask respondents in each study the extent to which they believe the president is (a) intelligent, (b) competent, and (c) knowledgeable about history. The three factors load well, with an average Cronbach's alpha across the three studies of 0.87.

## B Sample Description and Research Ethics

Researchers have a moral imperative to protect human subjects throughout the research process. In conducting surveys, we took the utmost care to comply with standards and obligations described in the APSA Principles and Guidance for Human Subject Research, and detailed in depth in the literature on ethics and survey research (e.g., [Deposato, 2018](#); [Phillips, 2021](#)). As described below, we took multiple steps to identify and mitigate risks associated with our research.

We conducted survey interviews with adult members of the U.S. public via the online sampling platform Lucid in 2023 and 2024. Our survey protocol went through an IRB review and approval process at the authors' institutions in the U.S. to ensure that the activities were in line with regulations regarding the protection of human subjects. We did not engage with vulnerable populations (e.g., children, prisoners), and the questions did not cover sensitive topics. We gathered no potentially identifying information through our survey, and all information about respondents' geographic location was automatically aggregated to a sufficiently high spatial level—the county, rather than the census tract or ZCTA—to prevent possible reidentification. All survey data are stored in a password-protected folder accessible only to the authors.

**Consent** We fielded our survey using Lucid, an online marketplace linking researchers with prospective survey participants through double opt-in panels via partner companies that maintain participant samples. Lucid is a well-known and validated platform for use in political science surveys ([Coppock and McClellan, 2019](#); [Peyton, Huber and Coppock, 2022](#)). All interviews proceeded with consent obtained by respondents doubly opting-in to take the survey. All respondents were also informed beforehand that they always had the option to opt-out during any point in the survey. The Authors paid a \$1.50 cost-per-completed interview fee to Lucid, while participants were directly compensated by Lucid's suppliers.

**Minimizing Risks and “Do No Harm”** The Authors consistently worked to abide by the “do no harm” standard, minimizing risks to human subjects while working to maximize the benefits of our research. We assessed that the potential contributions of our research project were substantial while risks were minimal. In addition to the potentially substantial benefits of this research, our team also worked to identify and mitigate risks to interviewees. First, we considered power differentials between ourselves and research participants. All interviewees were informed of their rights, including their ability to refuse to participate or to withdraw consent at any time. Second, before, during, and after interviews, we ensured that participants understood their responses would be held confidentially, and that no identifying information was collected or would be revealed. Third, no deception was used in the study. Fourth, we designed our interviews to reduce any possible harm. Specific steps we took included: (1) prospective respondents were notified via the pre-interview recruitment banner that the survey would be about their attitudes on foreign policy, reducing the risk that anyone who consented to participate would be surprised by or uncomfortable with the topics of conversation; and (2) selecting a context (the U.S.) and field site (online), where safety concerns were minimal.

In Table B-1 we confirm that demographics of our sample closely match the demographics of the U.S. population more broadly. This finding raises confidence in the representativeness of our surveys.

**Table B-1:** Sample Demographics vs. Census Benchmarks

	Lucid Surveys ( N = 4444)			Census Benchmarks
	(1) Study #1	(2) Study #2	(3) Study #3	(4) U.S. as a Whole
White	0.743	0.759	0.764	0.719
Black	0.118	0.144	0.126	0.116
Asian	0.051	0.035	0.066	0.037
Latinx	0.098	0.101	0.112	0.191
Woman	0.512	0.525	0.516	0.504
Age	46	49	47	39
High School Graduate	0.558	0.619	0.591	0.552
College Graduate	0.419	0.348	0.379	0.337
Income	\$45,000–\$49,999	\$50,000–\$54,999	\$50,000–\$54,999	\$69,021

## C Study #1

### C.1 Robustness

In Table C-1 we show that our core results displayed in Figures 1 and 2 in the main text hold when controlling for a range of covariates. Models 1-3 show that historical analogies significantly increase the public's perceptions that the president chose the best foreign policy strategy. Models 4-6 probe whether historical analogies increase perceptions that the president's chosen policy is likely to be successful. While the coefficient on *Historical Analogy* does not quite cross the threshold for statistical significance in Models 4 and 5 ( $p < 0.172$ ) because of the limited sample sizes, when we pool the Munich and Cuban Missile Crisis analogies in Model 6 the result is estimated more precisely and becomes statistically significant ( $p = 0.042$ ).<sup>1</sup> Models 7-9 demonstrate that historical analogies increase perceptions that the benefits of a policy outweigh its costs,<sup>2</sup> and Models 10-12 shows analogies increase positive presidential traits.<sup>3</sup> While Model 13 illustrates that the Munich analogy increased perceptions that the U.S. had a moral obligation to intervene to protect Taiwan, Model 14 indicates that a similar effect does not hold for the Cuban Missile Crisis analogy. As discussed in the main text, this makes logical sense since the Cuban Missile Crisis analogy does not prime ethical concerns to the same extent as the Munich analogy from World War II, which is viewed much more as a struggle between good and evil over the fate of the free world.

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<sup>1</sup>There is also interesting heterogeneity when disaggregating the success index. For example, the Cuban Missile Crisis analogy significantly increases perceptions that the president's policy will force China to dismantle its military base in Panama ( $p = 0.033$ ), but has no significant effect on the other two measures of success. The logic is likely that the Cuban Missile Crisis analogy speaks more directly to whether a blockade can specifically compel a country to abandon a particular military endeavor than whether it can achieve broader forms of success, such as helping prevent China from overtaking the United States as the world's most powerful and influential country.

<sup>2</sup>The effects are weakest for the cost measure of the cost-benefit index, which makes logical sense since the Munich analogy, for example, does not directly speak to whether the costs of intervention will be low. If anything, the association with World War II indicates the costs may be quite high.

<sup>3</sup>The effects are driven more by the questions asking about intelligence and knowledge about history.

## Table C-1: Study #1 Robustness Tests

	Best Policy Chosen			Policy Likely to be Successful			Benefits Exceed Costs			Positive Presidential Traits			Moral Obligation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Historical Analogy	0.208** (0.091)	0.173** (0.086)	0.191*** (0.064)	0.099 (0.072)	0.109 (0.078)	0.107** (0.053)	0.093* (0.055)	0.138** (0.056)	0.098** (0.040)	0.172** (0.074)	0.198*** (0.068)	0.186*** (0.051)	0.200** (0.089)	0.058 (0.082)	0.129** (0.062)
Republican President	0.154* (0.091)	-0.158* (0.087)	0.008 (0.063)	0.136* (0.072)	-0.110 (0.077)	0.027 (0.052)	0.077 (0.054)	-0.088 (0.056)	0.001 (0.040)	0.121* (0.072)	-0.155** (0.070)	-0.003 (0.050)	0.193** (0.088)	-0.204** (0.083)	0.009 (0.062)
Hawkishness	0.356*** (0.064)	0.265*** (0.058)	0.308*** (0.044)	0.280*** (0.051)	0.244*** (0.050)	0.263*** (0.036)	0.249*** (0.037)	0.125*** (0.040)	0.184*** (0.028)	0.230*** (0.050)	0.285*** (0.050)	0.252*** (0.036)	0.356*** (0.060)	0.376*** (0.056)	0.357*** (0.042)
Stronger Republican	-0.045** (0.021)	-0.025 (0.021)	-0.036** (0.015)	-0.068*** (0.018)	-0.036** (0.018)	-0.054*** (0.013)	-0.028** (0.012)	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.024*** (0.009)	-0.060*** (0.018)	-0.044*** (0.017)	-0.052*** (0.012)	-0.054*** (0.020)	0.002 (0.019)	-0.027* (0.014)
Foreign Policy Knowledge	0.281 (0.192)	-0.282 (0.190)	0.004 (0.136)	-0.125 (0.155)	-0.260 (0.178)	-0.199* (0.117)	-0.189* (0.107)	0.074 (0.120)	-0.074 (0.081)	0.226 (0.158)	0.094 (0.162)	0.134 (0.113)	0.342* (0.186)	-0.036 (0.182)	0.133 (0.131)
Education	0.020 (0.025)	0.050** (0.024)	0.033* (0.017)	-0.021 (0.019)	0.007 (0.022)	-0.010 (0.014)	-0.018 (0.015)	0.010 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.011)	0.006 (0.020)	0.030 (0.014)	0.016 (0.024)	-0.022 (0.023)	-0.008 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.017)
Male	0.113 (0.092)	0.010 (0.086)	0.073 (0.064)	0.096 (0.071)	-0.014 (0.078)	0.053 (0.053)	0.037 (0.053)	0.003 (0.057)	0.014 (0.040)	0.057 (0.073)	-0.045 (0.070)	0.015 (0.051)	0.232*** (0.090)	0.149* (0.082)	0.203*** (0.062)
Income	-0.007 (0.008)	0.010 (0.007)	0.002 (0.005)	0.015** (0.006)	0.003 (0.007)	0.009** (0.004)	0.001 (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)	0.005 (0.003)	0.011* (0.006)	0.008 (0.006)	0.010** (0.004)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.005)
Did Not Disclose Income	-0.293 (0.339)	-0.783* (0.447)	-0.559** (0.269)	-0.326 (0.270)	-0.378 (0.236)	-0.335* (0.186)	-0.479* (0.253)	-0.571** (0.269)	-0.513*** (0.190)	-0.043 (0.253)	-0.461** (0.232)	-0.226 (0.179)	-0.218 (0.329)	-0.184 (0.347)	-0.239 (0.254)
Age	-0.005* (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.004*** (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.003)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.003** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.004* (0.002)
White	-0.135 (0.106)	-0.095 (0.104)	-0.111 (0.075)	-0.160* (0.083)	-0.141 (0.094)	-0.151** (0.062)	-0.156*** (0.059)	-0.201*** (0.061)	-0.159*** (0.043)	0.043 (0.085)	-0.003 (0.079)	0.027 (0.059)	-0.202* (0.105)	-0.135 (0.105)	-0.165** (0.074)
Constant	2.274*** (0.259)	2.669*** (0.228)	2.473*** (0.173)	2.831*** (0.209)	2.851*** (0.214)	2.865*** (0.150)	2.597*** (0.150)	2.608*** (0.149)	2.636*** (0.108)	2.588*** (0.198)	2.414*** (0.189)	2.532*** (0.138)	2.507*** (0.249)	2.321*** (0.235)	2.455*** (0.173)
Observations	617	549	1166	617	549	1166	617	549	1166	617	549	1166	617	549	1166
Munich Analogy	✓	×	×	✓	×	×	✓	×	×	✓	×	×	✓	×	×
Cuban Missile Crisis Analogy	×	✓	×	×	✓	×	×	✓	×	×	✓	×	×	✓	×
Pooled	×	×	✓	×	×	✓	×	×	✓	×	×	✓	×	×	✓

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. \* = p < 0.10; \*\* = p < 0.05; \*\*\* = p < 0.01.

## C.2 Causal Mediation Analysis

In Table C-2 we conduct a more formal causal mediation analysis using the method described by Imai, Keele and Tingley (2010).<sup>4</sup> We first regress the mediator (e.g., perceived policy success, cost-benefit analysis, etc.) on the explanatory variable (historical analogies) to see if the explanatory variable impacts the hypothesized mediator. We then regress the mediator on the core outcome variable (believes the president chose the best foreign policy)—controlling for the explanatory variable—to test whether there’s a relationship between the mediator and dependent variable. For this analysis we pool results from the Munich and Cuban Missile Crisis analogies to maximize statistical power. Model 1, for example, shows that historical analogies significantly increase perceptions of policy success, and Model 2 indicates that perceptions of policy success significantly increase views that the president chose the best foreign policy strategy (controlling for the direct effect of historical analogies on the outcome variable). The average causal mediation effect (ACME) is statistically significant at the 5% level (the 95% confidence interval of the ACME is 0.0020 to 0.1302). The ACME is also significant at the 5% level for the other three mediators assessed in Models 3-8.

**Table C-2: Study #1 Mediation Analysis**

	(1) Success	(2) Best Policy	(3) Benefits > Costs	(4) Best Policy	(5) Positive Traits	(6) Best Policy	(7) Moral Obligation	(8) Best Policy
Historical Analogy	0.107** (0.053)	0.126** (0.055)	0.098** (0.040)	0.109** (0.054)	0.186*** (0.051)	0.069 (0.055)	0.129** (0.062)	0.131** (0.057)
Policy Likely to be Successful		0.605*** (0.035)						
Benefits Exceed Costs				0.830*** (0.040)				
Positive Presidential Trait						0.655*** (0.039)		
Moral Obligation to Intervene								0.463*** (0.030)
Republican President	0.027 (0.052)	-0.009 (0.054)	0.001 (0.040)	0.007 (0.054)	-0.003 (0.050)	0.010 (0.054)	0.009 (0.062)	0.004 (0.056)
Hawkishness	0.263*** (0.036)	0.149*** (0.037)	0.184*** (0.028)	0.155*** (0.033)	0.252*** (0.036)	0.143*** (0.035)	0.357*** (0.042)	0.142*** (0.039)
Stronger Republican	-0.054*** (0.013)	-0.003 (0.013)	-0.024*** (0.009)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.052*** (0.012)	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.027* (0.014)	-0.023* (0.014)
Foreign Policy Knowledge	-0.199* (0.117)	0.124 (0.117)	-0.074 (0.081)	0.065 (0.121)	0.134 (0.113)	-0.084 (0.125)	0.133 (0.131)	-0.058 (0.118)
Education	-0.010 (0.014)	0.039*** (0.015)	-0.002 (0.011)	0.035** (0.015)	0.016 (0.014)	0.023 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.017)	0.041*** (0.015)
Male	0.053 (0.053)	0.041 (0.055)	0.014 (0.040)	0.061 (0.055)	0.015 (0.051)	0.063 (0.054)	0.203*** (0.062)	-0.021 (0.057)
Income	0.009** (0.004)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.005 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.010** (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)
Did Not Disclose Income	-0.335* (0.186)	-0.357 (0.221)	-0.513*** (0.190)	-0.133 (0.208)	-0.226 (0.179)	-0.411* (0.235)	-0.239 (0.254)	-0.449* (0.264)
Age	-0.004*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.003** (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)
White	-0.151** (0.062)	-0.020 (0.070)	-0.159*** (0.043)	0.021 (0.066)	0.027 (0.059)	-0.128** (0.063)	-0.165** (0.074)	-0.034 (0.064)
Constant	2.865*** (0.150)	0.740*** (0.168)	2.636*** (0.108)	0.286 (0.180)	2.532*** (0.138)	0.815*** (0.173)	2.455*** (0.173)	1.336*** (0.168)
Observations	1166	1166	1166	1166	1166	1166	1166	1166
Mediation Effect Significant?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. \* = p < 0.10; \*\* = p < 0.05; \*\*\* = p < 0.01.

<sup>4</sup>We use the mediation package in STATA for this analysis (Hicks and Tingley, 2011).

### C.3 Heterogeneous Effects

In Table C-3 we test several potential heterogeneous effects, including several outlined in our pre-analysis plan.<sup>5</sup> We find no significant evidence of heterogeneous effects for a respondent’s level of hawkishness (Model 1), political identification (Model 2), whether the political identification of the president and the respondent match (Model 3), actual foreign policy knowledge (Model 4), education (Model 5), gender (Model 6), or age (Models 7 and 8). The null finding for age is particularly interesting since some studies show that older respondents / those that lived during the past event are more likely to find a historical analogy emotionally resonant and convincing (Schuman and Rieger, 1992; Thaler, Mueller and Mosinger, 2023). Note also that the null effects for age hold if we only analyze the Cuban Missile Crisis analogy, which was an event more respondents in our sample were alive for.

**Table C-3:** Study #1 Heterogeneous Effects


	Perceptions the President Chose the Best Foreign Policy Strategy							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical Analogy × Hawkishness	0.031 (0.084)							
Historical Analogy × Stronger Republican		0.015 (0.029)						
Historical Analogy × Co-Partisans			-0.123 (0.139)					
Historical Analogy × Foreign Policy Knowledge				0.141 (0.266)				
Historical Analogy × Education					0.044 (0.031)			
Historical Analogy × Male						-0.072 (0.128)		
Historical Analogy × Age							0.003 (0.004)	
Historical Analogy × Over 70								0.032 (0.235)
Historical Analogy	0.093 (0.275)	0.132 (0.127)	0.273*** (0.102)	0.105 (0.168)	-0.009 (0.156)	0.226** (0.088)	0.032 (0.182)	0.186*** (0.066)
Hawkishness	0.293*** (0.061)	0.308*** (0.044)	0.271*** (0.049)	0.308*** (0.044)	0.309*** (0.044)	0.308*** (0.044)	0.308*** (0.044)	0.301*** (0.043)
Stronger Republican	-0.036** (0.015)	-0.044** (0.021)	-0.029* (0.015)	-0.036** (0.015)	-0.036** (0.015)	-0.036** (0.015)	-0.036** (0.015)	-0.035** (0.015)
Co-Partisans			0.233** (0.101)					
Foreign Policy Knowledge	0.005 (0.136)	0.007 (0.136)	-0.088 (0.151)	-0.066 (0.194)	-0.001 (0.136)	0.004 (0.136)	0.003 (0.136)	-0.013 (0.136)
Education	0.033* (0.017)	0.033* (0.017)	0.029 (0.019)	0.033* (0.017)	0.011 (0.024)	0.033* (0.017)	0.033* (0.017)	0.028* (0.017)
Male	0.072 (0.064)	0.072 (0.064)	0.108 (0.070)	0.072 (0.064)	0.070 (0.064)	0.108 (0.092)	0.069 (0.064)	0.079 (0.064)
Age	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.003)	
Over 70								0.057 (0.174)
Republican President	0.006 (0.063)	0.006 (0.063)	-0.007 (0.070)	0.010 (0.064)	0.010 (0.063)	0.005 (0.064)	0.008 (0.063)	0.008 (0.063)
Income	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)
Did Not Disclose Income	-0.550** (0.272)	-0.553** (0.270)	-0.390 (0.309)	-0.558** (0.269)	-0.550** (0.271)	-0.559** (0.268)	-0.554** (0.269)	-0.559** (0.270)
White	-0.110 (0.075)	-0.112 (0.075)	-0.166* (0.086)	-0.110 (0.075)	-0.110 (0.075)	-0.110 (0.075)	-0.108 (0.075)	-0.134* (0.073)
Constant	2.519*** (0.225)	2.501*** (0.182)	2.555*** (0.206)	2.513*** (0.195)	2.574*** (0.190)	2.452*** (0.179)	2.554*** (0.198)	2.446*** (0.171)
Observations	1166	1166	984	1166	1166	1166	1166	1166

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. \* = p < 0.10; \*\* = p < 0.05; \*\*\* = p < 0.01.

<sup>5</sup>We again pool results from the Munich and Cuban Missile Crisis analogies to maximize statistical power.

In Figure C-1 we also take an alternative, flexible approach using a Bayesian hierarchical estimator to explore potential heterogeneity in the effect of historical analogies (Alley, 2023). We specifically fit a hierarchical model where treatment slopes and intercepts vary across groups and grouping variables modify the slopes. This flexible method reduces the risk of underpowered subgroup comparisons in Table C-3, while still allowing us to explore theoretically-relevant heterogeneous effects of interest. We find evidence that our historical analogy treatments have a greater effect among very hawkish respondents. This is perhaps because the historical analogies (Munich and Cuban Missile Crisis) in Study 1 point to the benefits of a relatively hawkish course of action, which is particularly appealing to hawkish respondents in that it accords with their priors.

**Figure C-1: Study #1 Heterogeneous Effects**



Note: We plot the impact of historical analogies on perceived policy credibility within demographic groups denoted in the subtitle. Box plots mark the distribution of the posterior median and bars summarize the 95% credible intervals.

## C.4 Pre-Registered Hypotheses

- Policy Credibility: When a leader uses a historical analogy to justify a foreign policy decision, audiences are more likely to believe the invoking leader chose the best foreign policy strategy.
  - Supported
- Success Mechanism: When a leader uses a historical analogy to justify a foreign policy decision, then audiences should be more likely to believe the chosen policy will lead to a successful outcome for their country.<sup>6</sup>
  - Mostly Supported: When aggregating the invasion of Taiwan and Chinese military base scenarios, there is a statistically significant effect. However, when analyzing each separately the effect is just under conventional levels of significance.
- Cost-Benefit Mechanism: When a leader uses a historical analogy to justify a foreign policy decision, then audiences should be more likely to believe the benefits of the chosen policy outweigh the costs.<sup>7</sup>
  - Supported
- Leader Traits Mechanism: When a leader uses a historical analogy to justify a foreign policy decision, then audiences should be more likely to believe that the leader is competent, intelligent, and knowledgeable about history.<sup>8</sup>
  - Supported
- Morality Mechanism: When a leader uses a historical analogy to justify a foreign policy decision, then audiences should be more likely to believe that the leader's chosen policy is morally just.
  - Somewhat Supported: Holds for the Munich analogy but not the Cuban Missile Crisis scenario
- Receiver Hawkishness Moderator: Historical analogies that imply a hawkish course of action will be more persuasive among hawkish respondents.
  - Mixed Support

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<sup>6</sup>In our original pre-analysis plan for Study #1, this hypothesis was divided into three separate hypotheses corresponding to the variables we utilize to create an index measure of success. We combine them here into a single hypothesis for the sake of parsimony.

<sup>7</sup>In our original pre-analysis plan for Study #1, this hypothesis was divided into three separate hypotheses corresponding to the variables we utilize to create an index measure of costs and benefits. We combine them here into a single hypothesis for the sake of parsimony.

<sup>8</sup>In our original pre-analysis plan for Study #1, this hypothesis was divided into three separate hypotheses corresponding to the variables we utilize to create an index measure of leader traits. We combine them here into a single hypothesis for the sake of parsimony.

- Receiver Party Moderator: Historical analogies that imply a hawkish course of action will be more persuasive among Republicans.
  - Not Supported
- Co-Partisan Moderator: Historical analogies made by co-partisan leaders will be more persuasive.
  - Not Supported
- Foreign Policy Knowledge Moderator: Analogies will be more persuasive among respondents with less actual or perceived foreign policy knowledge.
  - Not Supported
- Gender Moderator: Historical analogies will be more persuasive among men than women.
  - Not Supported
- Age Moderator: Historical analogies will be more persuasive among older respondents.
  - Not Supported
- Cohort Moderator: Analogies will be more persuasive among respondents who were at least ten when the analogized historical event occurred.
  - Not Supported
- Approval Hypothesis: When a leader uses a historical analogy to justify a foreign policy decision, then audiences should be more approving of the leader.
  - Not Supported
- Electability Hypothesis: When a leader uses a historical analogy to justify a foreign policy decision, then audiences should be more likely to support their re-election.
  - Not Supported
- Emotions Mechanism: When a leader uses a historical analogy to justify a foreign policy decision, then audiences should be less likely to feel worried, angry, or fearful about the leader's chosen policy and more likely to feel patriotic about the leaders' chosen policy.<sup>9</sup>
  - Not Supported: Does not quite reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

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<sup>9</sup>In our original pre-analysis plan for Study #1, this hypothesis was divided into three separate hypotheses corresponding to the variables we utilize to create an index measure of emotions. We combine them here into a single hypothesis for the sake of parsimony.

- Controlling for Success Hypothesis: When the public is informed that a leader's foreign policy decision led to a successful outcome, then the use of a historical analogy to justify that decision should have a smaller impact on that leader's approval than before the public is informed that the foreign policy decision led to a successful outcome.

- Not Supported

# D Study #2

## D.1 Robustness

In Table D-1 we show that our core results displayed in Figures 1 and 2 in the main text hold when controlling for a range of covariates. Model 1 shows that a historical analogy to the Bosnian War significantly increase the public’s perceptions that the president chose the best foreign policy strategy. Consistent with the null result in Figure 1 in the main text, there is no significant effect of the Vietnam War and Philippines War analogies on policy credibility (Model 2), though the effect is significant when all the results are pooled (Model 3). Historical analogies in Study 2 also consistently increase perceptions that the foreign policy chosen is likely to be successful (Models 4-6)<sup>10</sup> and that the president has positive traits (Models 10-12).<sup>11</sup> The Bosnian War analogy increases perceptions that the benefits of the chosen policy exceed the costs (Model 7),<sup>12</sup> but no similar effect exists for the Vietnam/Philippines War analogies ( $p = 0.223$ ). The results are also generally weak for the moral obligation mechanism (Models 13-15). This is especially surprising for the Bosnian War analogy, which clearly primes ethical concerns. The explanation is likely ceiling effects, as baseline views that the U.S. has a moral obligation to intervene in Myanmar to protect the Rohingya were high in the control condition (the average equalled over 3.5 on a 5-point scale and the median value equalled 4).

**Table D-1: Study #2 Robustness Tests**

	Best Policy Chosen			Policy Likely to be Successful			Benefits Exceed Costs			Positive Presidential Traits			Moral Obligation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Historical Analogy	0.300*** (0.080)	0.018 (0.077)	0.146*** (0.056)	0.277*** (0.063)	0.144** (0.062)	0.199*** (0.044)	0.148*** (0.051)	0.063 (0.052)	0.100*** (0.037)	0.315*** (0.061)	0.276*** (0.059)	0.287*** (0.043)	0.082 (0.077)	-0.035 (0.069)	0.025 (0.053)
Republican President	-0.055 (0.073)	0.033 (0.074)	-0.004 (0.052)	0.009 (0.058)	-0.015 (0.058)	-0.000 (0.041)	-0.029 (0.046)	-0.010 (0.047)	-0.019 (0.033)	0.026 (0.057)	0.102* (0.055)	0.066 (0.040)	-0.051 (0.072)	-0.114* (0.067)	-0.071 (0.049)
Hawkishness	0.347*** (0.046)	0.105** (0.050)	0.231*** (0.035)	0.233*** (0.040)	0.148*** (0.040)	0.190*** (0.028)	0.221*** (0.032)	0.104*** (0.034)	0.166*** (0.023)	0.247*** (0.037)	0.087** (0.040)	0.172*** (0.028)	0.216*** (0.047)	0.292*** (0.045)	0.263*** (0.033)
Stronger Republican	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.018** (0.008)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.029*** (0.009)	-0.018*** (0.007)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.016** (0.007)	-0.014*** (0.005)	-0.019** (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.008)	-0.025*** (0.006)	-0.028** (0.011)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.018** (0.008)
Foreign Policy Knowledge	-0.548*** (0.162)	0.227 (0.166)	-0.188 (0.117)	-0.195 (0.131)	-0.230* (0.133)	-0.197** (0.093)	-0.179* (0.103)	0.070 (0.104)	-0.071 (0.074)	-0.120 (0.125)	-0.186 (0.120)	0.019 (0.087)	-0.388** (0.156)	0.196 (0.158)	-0.118 (0.113)
Negativity Bias	-0.184*** (0.037)	-0.135*** (0.038)	-0.155*** (0.026)	-0.211*** (0.031)	-0.142*** (0.029)	-0.176*** (0.021)	-0.061*** (0.020)	-0.039* (0.022)	-0.048*** (0.015)	-0.181*** (0.028)	-0.130*** (0.033)	-0.155*** (0.021)	-0.168*** (0.034)	-0.128*** (0.035)	-0.142*** (0.025)
Education	0.015 (0.021)	0.014 (0.023)	0.014 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.017)	0.004 (0.018)	-0.000 (0.012)	-0.009 (0.014)	0.013 (0.015)	0.003 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.016)	0.000 (0.017)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.020)	-0.067*** (0.020)	-0.032** (0.014)
Male	0.063 (0.075)	-0.131* (0.077)	-0.039 (0.055)	0.023 (0.060)	0.060 (0.061)	0.032 (0.043)	0.073 (0.048)	0.060 (0.051)	0.065* (0.035)	-0.034 (0.061)	-0.000 (0.059)	-0.020 (0.043)	-0.015 (0.076)	-0.053 (0.072)	-0.020 (0.053)
Income	-0.004 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.005)	0.010** (0.005)	0.005 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.005)	0.008* (0.005)	0.005 (0.003)	-0.007 (0.006)	0.017*** (0.005)	0.006 (0.004)
Age	-0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.003* (0.002)
White	-0.003 (0.091)	0.019 (0.089)	0.020 (0.065)	-0.032 (0.075)	-0.093 (0.069)	-0.051 (0.051)	-0.031 (0.059)	0.027 (0.057)	0.002 (0.041)	0.018 (0.072)	0.026 (0.070)	0.027 (0.050)	0.084 (0.091)	0.077 (0.084)	0.076 (0.063)
Constant	3.506*** (0.309)	3.847*** (0.314)	3.675*** (0.220)	3.806*** (0.253)	4.077*** (0.253)	3.971*** (0.181)	2.901*** (0.176)	2.906*** (0.192)	2.891*** (0.131)	3.824*** (0.233)	3.837*** (0.252)	3.827*** (0.171)	4.315*** (0.296)	3.480*** (0.292)	3.804*** (0.210)
Observations	886	923	1809	886	923	1809	886	923	1809	886	922	1808	886	923	1809
Myanmar Scenario	✓	×	×	✓	×	×	✓	×	×	✓	×	×	✓	×	×
Iran Scenario	×	✓	×	×	✓	×	×	✓	×	×	✓	×	×	✓	×
Pooled	×	×	✓	×	×	✓	×	×	✓	×	×	✓	×	×	✓

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. \* =  $p < 0.10$ ; \*\* =  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* =  $p < 0.01$ .

<sup>10</sup>The Bosnian analogy significantly increases perceptions of policy success for each of the three different measures in our success index.

<sup>11</sup>The Bosnian and Vietnam/Philippines War analogies increase perceptions that the president has positive traits for each of the three different measures that make up our index.

<sup>12</sup>Disaggregating the index, there is a null result for the measure asking about costs, which makes logical sense since the Bosnian War analogy did not mention anything explicitly about the costs of humanitarian intervention.

## D.2 Causal Mediation Analysis

In Table D-2 we again conduct a more formal causal mediation analysis. All of the average causal mediation effects are statistically significant at the 5% level, except for the hypothesized morality mechanism.

**Table D-2: Study #2 Mediation Analysis**

	(1) Success	(2) Best Policy	(3) Benefits > Costs	(4) Best Policy	(5) Positive Traits	(6) Best Policy	(7) Moral Obligation	(8) Best Policy
Historical Analogy	0.199*** (0.044)	0.001 (0.046)	0.100*** (0.037)	0.061 (0.046)	0.287*** (0.043)	-0.056 (0.047)	0.025 (0.053)	0.136*** (0.052)
Policy Likely to be Successful		0.729*** (0.026)						
Benefits Exceed Costs				0.855*** (0.031)				
Positive Presidential Trait						0.701*** (0.030)		
Moral Obligation to Intervene								0.381*** (0.027)
Republican President	-0.000 (0.041)	-0.004 (0.043)	-0.019 (0.033)	0.013 (0.044)	0.066 (0.040)	-0.051 (0.044)	-0.071 (0.049)	0.023 (0.049)
Hawkishness	0.190*** (0.028)	0.092*** (0.027)	0.166*** (0.023)	0.089*** (0.026)	0.172*** (0.028)	0.111*** (0.028)	0.263*** (0.033)	0.131*** (0.032)
Stronger Republican	-0.018*** (0.007)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.014*** (0.005)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.025*** (0.006)	0.000 (0.007)	-0.018** (0.008)	-0.011 (0.007)
Foreign Policy Knowledge	-0.197*** (0.093)	-0.044 (0.095)	-0.071 (0.074)	-0.127 (0.100)	0.019 (0.087)	-0.199** (0.101)	-0.118 (0.113)	-0.143 (0.108)
Negativity Bias	-0.176*** (0.021)	-0.027 (0.022)	-0.048*** (0.015)	-0.114*** (0.022)	-0.155*** (0.021)	-0.047** (0.023)	-0.142*** (0.025)	-0.101*** (0.024)
Education	-0.000 (0.012)	0.014 (0.013)	0.003 (0.010)	0.012 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.012)	0.016 (0.013)	-0.032** (0.014)	0.026* (0.015)
Male	0.032 (0.043)	-0.062 (0.044)	0.065* (0.035)	-0.094** (0.047)	-0.020 (0.043)	-0.024 (0.047)	-0.020 (0.053)	-0.031 (0.051)
Income	0.005 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)	0.005 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)
Age	-0.003** (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	0.003* (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
White	-0.051 (0.051)	0.057 (0.055)	0.002 (0.041)	0.018 (0.055)	0.027 (0.050)	0.000 (0.056)	0.076 (0.063)	-0.009 (0.061)
Constant	3.971*** (0.181)	0.781*** (0.196)	2.891*** (0.131)	1.204*** (0.204)	3.827*** (0.171)	0.988*** (0.212)	3.804*** (0.210)	2.227*** (0.226)
Observations	1809	1809	1809	1809	1808	1808	1809	1809
Mediation Effect Significant?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. \* =  $p < 0.10$ ; \*\* =  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* =  $p < 0.01$ .

### D.3 Heterogeneous Effects

In Table D-3 we test several potential heterogeneous effects for the impact of analogies on policy credibility in the Myanmar scenario.<sup>13</sup> We find no significant evidence of heterogeneous effects for a respondent's level of negativity bias (Model 1), hawkishness (Model 2), whether the political identification of the president and the respondent match (Model 4), actual foreign policy knowledge (Model 5), education (Model 6), gender (Model 7), or age (Models 8 and 9).<sup>14</sup> As indicated in Model 3, we do find some evidence that historical analogies have a smaller effect on policy credibility among respondents that are stronger Republicans ( $p = 0.082$ ). The effect even strengthens when we utilize a binary variable indicating a respondent identified as a Republican rather than the full 10-point measure ( $p = 0.037$ ). The explanation may again be ceiling effects, as baseline views that the U.S. should intervene in Myanmar were high in the control condition among Republican respondents (the average equalled over 3.3 on a 5-point scale and the median value equalled 4). Thus, analogies may simply have had less room to move Republicans.

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<sup>13</sup>Given the different effects of analogies on policy credibility for the Myanmar and Iran scenarios, we conduct separate analyses rather than a pooled one.

<sup>14</sup>We use a binary variable for whether the respondent is 40 years of age or older in Model 9 because that indicates whether they were at least 10 years old when the Bosnian War ended.


**Table D-3: Study #2 Heterogeneous Effects for Myanmar Scenario**

	Perceptions the President Chose the Best Foreign Policy Strategy								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Historical Analogy × Negativity Bias	-0.046 (0.077)								
Historical Analogy × Hawkishness		0.091 (0.095)							
Historical Analogy × Stronger Republican			-0.042* (0.024)						
Historical Analogy × Co-Partisans				-0.199 (0.192)					
Historical Analogy × Foreign Policy Knowledge					-0.079 (0.357)				
Historical Analogy × Education						0.030 (0.041)			
Historical Analogy × Male							0.085 (0.158)		
Historical Analogy × Age								0.004 (0.005)	
Historical Analogy × Over 40									-0.087 (0.166)
Historical Analogy	0.587 (0.483)	0.010 (0.315)	0.509*** (0.147)	0.349** (0.136)	0.352 (0.241)	0.172 (0.186)	0.260** (0.107)	0.097 (0.254)	0.360*** (0.136)
Negativity Bias	-0.153** (0.068)	-0.184*** (0.037)	-0.181*** (0.037)	-0.191*** (0.042)	-0.185*** (0.037)	-0.184*** (0.036)	-0.185*** (0.037)	-0.183*** (0.037)	-0.186*** (0.036)
Hawkishness	0.346*** (0.046)	0.285*** (0.082)	0.345*** (0.046)	0.359*** (0.055)	0.347*** (0.046)	0.346*** (0.046)	0.346*** (0.046)	0.349*** (0.046)	0.345*** (0.046)
Stronger Republican	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.014 (0.012)	0.014 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.012)	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.014 (0.012)
Co-Partisans				0.368** (0.164)					
Foreign Policy Knowledge	-0.554*** (0.162)	-0.546*** (0.162)	-0.539*** (0.162)	-0.565*** (0.189)	-0.493 (0.312)	-0.548*** (0.162)	-0.553*** (0.161)	-0.549*** (0.162)	-0.552*** (0.161)
Education	0.015 (0.021)	0.014 (0.021)	0.015 (0.021)	0.024 (0.025)	0.014 (0.021)	-0.005 (0.036)	0.014 (0.021)	0.015 (0.021)	0.014 (0.021)
Male	0.064 (0.075)	0.062 (0.075)	0.059 (0.075)	0.092 (0.090)	0.064 (0.075)	0.062 (0.075)	0.005 (0.138)	0.061 (0.075)	0.067 (0.075)
Age	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)	
Over 40									0.057 (0.146)
Republican President	-0.054 (0.073)	-0.057 (0.073)	-0.061 (0.072)	-0.087 (0.087)	-0.055 (0.073)	-0.056 (0.072)	-0.057 (0.072)	-0.054 (0.072)	-0.056 (0.073)
Income	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)
White	-0.001 (0.091)	-0.007 (0.092)	0.001 (0.091)	0.003 (0.111)	-0.003 (0.091)	-0.008 (0.091)	-0.002 (0.091)	-0.006 (0.091)	-0.008 (0.090)
Constant	3.316*** (0.463)	3.699*** (0.374)	3.347*** (0.324)	3.376*** (0.369)	3.473*** (0.349)	3.591*** (0.324)	3.541*** (0.313)	3.633*** (0.353)	3.463*** (0.319)
Observations	886	886	886	627	886	886	886	886	886

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. \* = p < 0.10; \*\* = p < 0.05; \*\*\* = p < 0.01.

In Figure D-1 we also take an alternative, flexible approach using a Bayesian hierarchical estimator to explore potential heterogeneity in the effect of historical analogies (Alley, 2023). We specifically fit a hierarchical model where treatment slopes and intercepts vary across groups and grouping variables modify the slopes. This flexible method reduces the risk of underpowered subgroup comparisons in Table D-3, while still allowing us to explore theoretically-relevant heterogeneous effects of interest. We find evidence that our historical analogy treatments have a greater effect among less foreign policy knowledgeable respondents, and some (though weaker than in Studies 1 and 3) evidence that the effect is greater among hawkish respondents.

**Figure D-1: Study #2 Heterogeneous Effects for Myanmar Scenario**



Note: We plot the impact of historical analogies on perceived policy credibility within demographic groups denoted in the subtitle. Box plots mark the distribution of the posterior median and bars summarize the 95% credible interval.

In Table D-4 we test several potential heterogeneous effects for the impact of analogies on policy credibility in the Iran scenario. We find no significant interaction effects for any variable, including respondent political identification. The null for age also holds if we focus just on the Vietnam War analogy, which some respondents in our sample were alive for.


**Table D-4: Study #2 Heterogeneous Effects for Iran Scenario**

	Perceptions the President Chose the Best Foreign Policy Strategy								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Historical Analogy × Negativity Bias	-0.002 (0.073)								
Historical Analogy × Hawkishness		-0.082 (0.100)							
Historical Analogy × Stronger Republican			0.003 (0.023)						
Historical Analogy × Co-Partisans				-0.180 (0.179)					
Historical Analogy × Foreign Policy Knowledge					-0.145 (0.339)				
Historical Analogy × Education						0.014 (0.042)			
Historical Analogy × Male							-0.076 (0.155)		
Historical Analogy × Age								0.005 (0.005)	
Historical Analogy × Over 70									0.101 (0.236)
Historical Analogy	0.034 (0.465)	0.282 (0.327)	0.006 (0.135)	0.121 (0.131)	0.110 (0.227)	-0.044 (0.196)	0.054 (0.109)	-0.251 (0.227)	0.006 (0.082)
Negativity Bias	-0.133** (0.060)	-0.135*** (0.038)	-0.135*** (0.038)	-0.154*** (0.044)	-0.135*** (0.038)	-0.135*** (0.038)	-0.135*** (0.038)	-0.135*** (0.038)	-0.135*** (0.037)
Hawkishness	0.105** (0.050)	0.159* (0.083)	0.105** (0.050)	0.084 (0.059)	0.104** (0.050)	0.105** (0.051)	0.104** (0.050)	0.105** (0.050)	0.104** (0.049)
Stronger Republican	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.020)	-0.011 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.012)
Co-Partisans				0.310** (0.149)					
Foreign Policy Knowledge	0.227 (0.166)	0.223 (0.166)	0.227 (0.166)	0.049 (0.191)	0.324 (0.279)	0.228 (0.166)	0.223 (0.166)	0.222 (0.166)	0.225 (0.166)
Education	0.014 (0.023)	0.013 (0.023)	0.014 (0.023)	0.019 (0.026)	0.014 (0.023)	0.004 (0.035)	0.013 (0.023)	0.013 (0.023)	0.013 (0.022)
Male	-0.131* (0.077)	-0.131* (0.077)	-0.132* (0.077)	-0.037 (0.089)	-0.132* (0.077)	-0.131* (0.077)	-0.080 (0.127)	-0.136* (0.077)	-0.135* (0.077)
Age	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.004)	
Over 70									0.006 (0.193)
Republican President	0.033 (0.074)	0.032 (0.074)	0.033 (0.074)	-0.011 (0.087)	0.032 (0.074)	0.032 (0.074)	0.033 (0.074)	0.033 (0.074)	0.031 (0.074)
Income	0.005 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)	0.003 (0.007)	0.005 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)
White	0.019 (0.090)	0.019 (0.089)	0.019 (0.089)	0.031 (0.104)	0.018 (0.089)	0.020 (0.089)	0.021 (0.089)	0.019 (0.089)	0.017 (0.088)
Constant	3.836*** (0.429)	3.675*** (0.378)	3.854*** (0.324)	4.025*** (0.365)	3.788*** (0.341)	3.887*** (0.329)	3.823*** (0.321)	4.036*** (0.344)	3.889*** (0.314)
Observations	923	923	923	700	923	923	923	923	923

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. \* = p < 0.10; \*\* = p < 0.05; \*\*\* = p < 0.01.

In Figure D-2 we also take an alternative, flexible approach using a Bayesian hierarchical estimator to explore potential heterogeneity in the effect of historical analogies (Alley, 2023). We specifically fit a hierarchical model where treatment slopes and intercepts vary across groups and grouping variables modify the slopes. This flexible method reduces the risk of underpowered subgroup comparisons in Table D-4, while still allowing us to explore theoretically-relevant heterogeneous effects of interest. We find no evidence of effect heterogeneity.

**Figure D-2:** Study #2 Heterogeneous Effects for Iran Scenario



Note: We plot the impact of historical analogies on perceived policy credibility within demographic groups denoted in the subtitle. Box plots mark the distribution of the posterior median and bars summarize the 95% credible interval.

## D.4 Positive vs. Negative & More vs. Less Familiar Analogies

Table D-5 shows that we generally do not find support for our pre-registered hypothesis related to valence. Positive historical analogies are no less effective than negative analogies in terms of perceptions that the president chose the best foreign policy strategy (Model 1), perceptions that the benefits of the chosen policy outweigh the costs (Model 5), positive presidential traits (Model 7), or a perceived moral obligation to intervene (Model 9). Perhaps unsurprisingly, positive historical analogies that prime a prior success increase respondents' confidence that the current policy will lead to success relative to negative historical analogies that prime a prior failure (Model 3). However, on balance, we find no consistent evidence that negative historical analogies are more persuasive than positive ones. We also find no evidence that negative analogies are more effective than positive analogies among respondents that score higher in a measure of negativity bias.<sup>15</sup>

Table D-5 also demonstrates only mixed evidence for our familiarity hypothesis. Although using a more rather than less familiar historical analogy does increase respondents' perceptions that the president's policy is likely to be successful (Model 4), the president has positive traits (Model 8), and the U.S. has a moral obligation to intervene (Model 10), it does not significantly impact our primary outcome variable: whether the president chose the best foreign policy strategy (Model 2). However, presidents deploying more rather than less familiar analogies does significantly increase approval for the president ( $p = 0.026$ ) and support for the president being re-elected ( $p = 0.084$ ). Thus, there is some—but not fully consistent—evidence for our pre-registered expectations.

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<sup>15</sup>We estimate interaction models for the full 11-point measure, a binary measure based on the median split, and a binary measure based on the interquartile range.

**Table D-5:** Study #2 Positive vs. Negative and More vs. Less Familiar Analogies

	Best Policy		Success		Benefits > Costs		Positive Pres Traits		Moral Obligation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Positive vs. Negative Analogies	0.049 (0.084)		0.115* (0.067)		0.003 (0.054)		0.074 (0.068)		0.078 (0.084)	
More vs. Less Familiar Analogies		0.084 (0.091)		0.144** (0.070)		0.035 (0.057)		0.129* (0.068)		0.173** (0.082)
Republican President	-0.049 (0.085)	0.032 (0.091)	0.006 (0.068)	0.025 (0.070)	-0.026 (0.054)	0.045 (0.056)	-0.036 (0.069)	0.182*** (0.068)	-0.097 (0.085)	-0.045 (0.083)
Hawkishness	0.383*** (0.055)	0.063 (0.061)	0.258*** (0.048)	0.118** (0.047)	0.256*** (0.037)	0.047 (0.039)	0.285*** (0.045)	0.040 (0.050)	0.224*** (0.057)	0.269*** (0.056)
Stronger Republican	-0.030** (0.014)	-0.007 (0.014)	-0.018 (0.011)	-0.026** (0.011)	-0.023*** (0.009)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.030*** (0.011)	-0.020* (0.010)	-0.043*** (0.014)	-0.010 (0.013)
Foreign Policy Knowledge	-0.596*** (0.187)	0.173 (0.204)	-0.281* (0.157)	-0.273* (0.159)	-0.100 (0.121)	0.091 (0.127)	-0.083 (0.147)	0.279** (0.140)	-0.360** (0.182)	0.161 (0.191)
Negativity Bias	-0.191*** (0.042)	-0.141*** (0.047)	-0.210*** (0.037)	-0.154*** (0.035)	-0.070*** (0.023)	-0.049** (0.024)	-0.178*** (0.033)	-0.164*** (0.034)	-0.159*** (0.042)	-0.119*** (0.045)
Education	0.020 (0.025)	0.017 (0.028)	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.007 (0.021)	-0.002 (0.016)	0.021 (0.017)	0.002 (0.020)	-0.002 (0.021)	0.003 (0.025)	-0.072*** (0.025)
Male	0.094 (0.088)	-0.144 (0.096)	0.059 (0.071)	0.090 (0.073)	0.091 (0.056)	0.091 (0.060)	-0.008 (0.074)	0.009 (0.073)	-0.028 (0.093)	0.020 (0.089)
Income	-0.002 (0.007)	0.005 (0.008)	0.001 (0.006)	0.012** (0.006)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.017*** (0.006)
Age	0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.004 (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.008*** (0.003)
White	-0.010 (0.109)	-0.059 (0.115)	0.011 (0.087)	-0.202** (0.083)	0.006 (0.068)	-0.011 (0.070)	-0.036 (0.087)	-0.016 (0.089)	0.032 (0.108)	-0.060 (0.104)
Constant	3.666*** (0.365)	3.926*** (0.393)	3.961*** (0.297)	4.374*** (0.312)	2.856*** (0.204)	3.047*** (0.224)	3.930*** (0.284)	4.244*** (0.301)	4.379*** (0.357)	3.378*** (0.373)
Observations	600	617	600	617	600	617	600	616	600	617

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. \* = p < 0.10; \*\* = p < 0.05; \*\*\* = p < 0.01.

## D.5 Pre-Registered Hypotheses

- Analogies vs. Control: When a leader uses a historical analogy to justify a foreign policy decision, then audiences should be more positively disposed towards the policy and the leader compared to when a leader does not use a historical analogy.
  - Somewhat Supported: This hypothesis holds when the Bosnian War analogy is used in the Myanmar scenario, but does not consistently hold when the Vietnam War/Philippine–American War analogy is used in the Iran scenario.
  
- Positive vs. Negative Analogies: When a leader uses a negative historical analogy that primes a prior failure to justify a foreign policy decision, then audiences should be more positively disposed towards the policy and the leader compared to when they use a positive historical analogy that primes a prior success to justify a foreign policy decision.
  - Not Supported
  
- Negativity Bias Moderator: The above “Positive vs. Negative Analogies” hypothesis should be more likely to hold among respondents that have a stronger negativity bias.
  - Not Supported
  
- More vs. Less Familiar Analogies: When a leader uses a more familiar historical analogy to justify a foreign policy decision, then audiences should be more positively disposed towards the policy and the leader compared to when they use a less familiar historical analogy to justify a foreign policy decision.
  - Somewhat Supported: The results hold when using variables measuring presidential approval, support for re-election, perceived chance of policy success, and positive presidential traits, but not for policy credibility or perceptions about whether the benefits of the policy outweigh the costs.

## E Study #3

### E.1 Robustness

In Table E-1 we show that our core results displayed in Figures 1 and 2 in the main text hold when controlling for a range of covariates. Relative to a control condition where the president does not make an affirmative justification for his policy, the use of historical analogies increases perceptions that the president chose the best foreign policy strategy (Model 1), the policy is likely to be successful (Model 2),<sup>16</sup> the benefits of the policy outweigh the costs (Model 3),<sup>17</sup> the president has positive traits (Model 4),<sup>18</sup> and the U.S. has an ethical obligation to intervene to protect Taiwan (Model 5).

**Table E-1:** Study #3 Robustness Tests

	Best Policy Chosen	Policy Likely to be Successful	Benefits Exceed Costs	Positive Presidential Traits	Moral Obligation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Historical Analogy	0.344*** (0.077)	0.251*** (0.062)	0.259*** (0.050)	0.435*** (0.059)	0.260*** (0.080)
Republican President	-0.102 (0.078)	-0.034 (0.062)	-0.083* (0.050)	-0.142** (0.058)	-0.045 (0.081)
Hawkishness	0.513*** (0.051)	0.349*** (0.045)	0.283*** (0.036)	0.290*** (0.043)	0.420*** (0.056)
Stronger Republican	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.025** (0.010)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.029*** (0.009)	-0.037*** (0.013)
Foreign Policy Knowledge	-0.109 (0.173)	0.044 (0.146)	-0.301*** (0.116)	0.223 (0.139)	0.120 (0.188)
Education	-0.063 (0.087)	-0.100 (0.071)	-0.023 (0.058)	0.028 (0.068)	0.104 (0.090)
Male	0.255*** (0.079)	0.174*** (0.063)	0.036 (0.052)	0.151** (0.060)	0.208** (0.082)
Income	-0.003 (0.006)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.007)
Age	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003** (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
White	-0.038 (0.086)	-0.104 (0.070)	-0.185*** (0.056)	0.050 (0.075)	0.050 (0.096)
Constant	1.639*** (0.209)	2.199*** (0.174)	2.351*** (0.143)	2.310*** (0.169)	1.923*** (0.224)
Observations	756	756	756	756	756

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. \* =  $p < 0.10$ ; \*\* =  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* =  $p < 0.01$ .

<sup>16</sup>This result holds for each of the three different measures that make up our index measure.

<sup>17</sup>As in Study 1, when disaggregating the index measure we find a null effect for the cost measure, but significant effects for the questions asking about benefits in isolation and whether the benefits outweigh the costs.

<sup>18</sup>The use of a historical analogy significantly increases perceptions the president has positive traits for all three of the measures in the index.

## E.2 Causal Mediation Analysis

In Table E-2 we again conduct a more formal causal mediation analysis. All of the average causal mediation effects are statistically significant at the 5% level, as in Study 1. The consistent results across Studies 1 and 3, which deployed nearly identical experimental designs, helps build confidence in the findings.

**Table E-2: Study #3 Mediation Analysis**

	(1) Success	(2) Best Policy	(3) Benefits > Costs	(4) Best Policy	(5) Positive Traits	(6) Best Policy	(7) Moral Obligation	(8) Best Policy
Historical Analogy	0.251*** (0.062)	0.178*** (0.066)	0.259*** (0.050)	0.117* (0.065)	0.435*** (0.059)	0.071 (0.071)	0.260*** (0.080)	0.211*** (0.067)
Policy Likely to be Successful		0.663*** (0.040)						
Benefits Exceed Costs				0.878*** (0.047)				
Positive Presidential Trait						0.628*** (0.044)		
Moral Obligation to Intervene								0.512*** (0.033)
Republican President	-0.034 (0.062)	-0.079 (0.065)	-0.083* (0.050)	-0.028 (0.064)	-0.142** (0.058)	-0.012 (0.069)	-0.045 (0.081)	-0.079 (0.066)
Hawkishness	0.349*** (0.045)	0.282*** (0.042)	0.283*** (0.036)	0.265*** (0.043)	0.290*** (0.043)	0.331*** (0.046)	0.420*** (0.056)	0.298*** (0.044)
Stronger Republican	-0.025** (0.010)	0.009 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.029*** (0.009)	0.010 (0.011)	-0.037*** (0.013)	0.011 (0.010)
Foreign Policy Knowledge	0.044 (0.146)	-0.138 (0.155)	-0.301*** (0.116)	0.156 (0.152)	0.223 (0.139)	-0.249 (0.157)	0.120 (0.188)	-0.170 (0.150)
college	-0.100 (0.071)	0.003 (0.073)	-0.023 (0.058)	-0.043 (0.072)	0.028 (0.068)	-0.080 (0.076)	0.104 (0.090)	-0.116 (0.073)
Male	0.174*** (0.063)	0.139** (0.067)	0.036 (0.052)	0.223*** (0.065)	0.151** (0.060)	0.160** (0.071)	0.208** (0.082)	0.149** (0.067)
Income	0.002 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.005)
Age	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.003** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
White	-0.104 (0.070)	0.031 (0.074)	-0.185*** (0.056)	0.125 (0.077)	0.050 (0.075)	-0.069 (0.076)	0.050 (0.096)	-0.063 (0.072)
Constant	2.199*** (0.174)	0.182 (0.189)	2.351*** (0.143)	-0.426** (0.209)	2.310*** (0.169)	0.189 (0.199)	1.923*** (0.224)	0.655*** (0.189)
Observations	756	756	756	756	756	756	756	756
Mediation Effect Significant?	—	✓	—	✓	—	✓	—	✓

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. \* =  $p < 0.10$ ; \*\* =  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* =  $p < 0.01$ .

### E.3 Heterogeneous Effects

In Table E-3 we test several potential heterogeneous effects. As in Study 1, all tests yield null results.


**Table E-3:** Study #3 Heterogeneous Effects

	Perceptions the President Chose the Best Foreign Policy Strategy							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical Analogy × Hawkishness	-0.064 (0.094)							
Historical Analogy × Stronger Republican		-0.031 (0.024)						
Historical Analogy × Co-Partisans			0.006 (0.173)					
Historical Analogy × Foreign Policy Knowledge				0.549 (0.341)				
Historical Analogy × Education					0.185 (0.159)			
Historical Analogy × Male						-0.051 (0.153)		
Historical Analogy × Age							-0.003 (0.004)	
Historical Analogy × Over 70								-0.053 (0.267)
Historical Analogy	0.544* (0.300)	0.496*** (0.133)	0.348*** (0.128)	-0.026 (0.245)	0.273*** (0.097)	0.369*** (0.108)	0.491** (0.211)	0.350*** (0.081)
Hawkishness	0.543*** (0.073)	0.512*** (0.051)	0.518*** (0.056)	0.513*** (0.051)	0.516*** (0.051)	0.513*** (0.051)	0.514*** (0.051)	0.508*** (0.051)
Stronger Republican	-0.008 (0.012)	0.008 (0.018)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)
Co-Partisans			0.208 (0.127)					
Foreign Policy Knowledge	-0.107 (0.173)	-0.115 (0.173)	-0.004 (0.190)	-0.364 (0.233)	-0.113 (0.173)	-0.109 (0.173)	-0.106 (0.173)	-0.112 (0.173)
Education	-0.064 (0.087)	-0.064 (0.087)	-0.058 (0.095)	-0.066 (0.087)	-0.155 (0.119)	-0.062 (0.087)	-0.062 (0.087)	-0.064 (0.086)
Male	0.254*** (0.079)	0.256*** (0.079)	0.298*** (0.089)	0.255*** (0.079)	0.254*** (0.079)	0.280** (0.112)	0.252*** (0.079)	0.258*** (0.079)
Age	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.003)	
Income	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)
Republican President	-0.102 (0.078)	-0.104 (0.078)	-0.006 (0.088)	-0.101 (0.078)	-0.098 (0.078)	-0.101 (0.078)	-0.102 (0.078)	-0.100 (0.078)
White	-0.038 (0.086)	-0.043 (0.086)	-0.074 (0.096)	-0.032 (0.086)	-0.040 (0.086)	-0.037 (0.086)	-0.041 (0.086)	-0.046 (0.085)
Constant	1.548*** (0.265)	1.570*** (0.218)	1.454*** (0.241)	1.815*** (0.240)	1.670*** (0.212)	1.629*** (0.214)	1.568*** (0.232)	1.581*** (0.201)
Observations	756	756	618	756	756	756	756	756

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. \* = p < 0.10; \*\* = p < 0.05; \*\*\* = p < 0.01.

In Figure E-1 we also take an alternative, flexible approach using a Bayesian hierarchical estimator to explore potential heterogeneity in the effect of historical analogies (Alley, 2023). We specifically fit a hierarchical model where treatment slopes and intercepts vary across groups and grouping variables modify the slopes. This flexible method reduces the risk of underpowered subgroup comparisons in Table E-3, while still allowing us to explore theoretically-relevant heterogeneous effects of interest. We find evidence that our historical analogy treatments have a greater effect among very hawkish respondents. Again, this is perhaps because the historical analogy (Munich) in Study 3 point to the benefits of a relatively hawkish course of action, which is particularly appealing to hawkish respondents in that it accords with their priors.

**Figure E-1: Study #3 Heterogeneous Effects**



Note: We plot the impact of historical analogies on perceived policy credibility within demographic groups denoted in the subtitle. Box plots mark the distribution of the posterior median and bars summarize the 95% credible interval.

## E.4 Historical Analogies vs. Appeals to Intuition/Experts

There were two primary goals of Study 3. First, to test the external validity of our findings from Study 1. Second, to assess how effective the use of historical analogies are as a political communications strategy relative to other types of potential justifications. In Study 1, the counter-factual we compared historical analogies against was a situation where the president does not invoke any kind of justification for their policy choice. In Study 3, we tested whether the nature of the counter-factual matters. This study closely resembled the invasion of Taiwan scenario from Study 1, except we add two additional experimental conditions. One involves the president appealing to their intuition, or “gut,” to justify their decision, and the other involves an appeal to experts.

In the control condition, the president announces his decision to “deploy the American military to directly prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan”, but does not provide additional justification. In the historical analogy condition, the president explains his policy decision by saying, “after studying the lessons of history, I believe that failing to act would simply lead to more Chinese aggression in the future.” He then goes on to outline how the Munich analogy is applicable. In the expert condition, the president says, “after consulting with Department of Defense and State Department experts who have studied China extensively over a period of decades, I believe that failing to act would simply lead to more Chinese aggression in the future.”<sup>19</sup> Finally, in the intuition condition, the president says,

“I am doing so because my gut and intuition are strongly telling me that failing to act would simply lead to more Chinese aggression in the future. I have a feeling in my stomach that China has expansionist goals, the psychology of their leaders disposes them to aggression, and China has strong military capabilities that could enable them to expand their territory further beyond Taiwan. Allowing China to take over Taiwan would likely just embolden them to pursue future land conquests.”

Our pre-registered expectation was that historical analogies would impact public opinion to a greater extent than less logically-based explanations, such as appeals to intuition, but would not be significantly more effective as a public relations strategy than more logically-based explanations, such as an appeal to the views of experts. We test these hypotheses in Table E-3. Compared to when the president references their gut/intuition as a policy justification, historical analogies increase respondents’ perceptions that the president chose the best strategy (Model 1), the benefits of their policy outweigh the costs (Model 5), and the president has positive traits, such as competence and intelligence (Model 7). On the other hand, the results are not significant for perceived policy success and views about whether the U.S. has a moral obligation to intervene. Still, the fact that there is a significant result for our primary dependent variable indicates that there are some types of justifications that are less effective at moving public opinion in the realm of foreign policy than historical analogies.

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<sup>19</sup>We include both State Department and Defense Department experts to mitigate any bias respondents might have to either of those specific agencies.

Also as expected, historical analogies are generally not more effective than an appeal to experts, which is a similarly logic-based explanation. There is not a significant difference between the analogy and expert treatment for our primary policy credibility outcome variable (Model 2), for perceptions of policy success (Model 4), or beliefs about whether the U.S. has a moral obligation to intervene (Model 10). On the other hand, there is a significant difference for the positive presidential traits variable (Model 8). However, note that the results for this index measure of positive presidential traits are driven by the knowledge of history measure rather than the intelligence or competence measures. Since the use of historical analogies directly signals the president is knowledgeable about history, the statistically significant result for the positive traits index measure should be taken with a grain of salt.

Finally, we asked a battery of pre-treatment questions taken from [Bertsou and Caramani \(2022\)](#), which were designed to measure anti-expert sentiment. We pre-registered a hypothesis that respondents high in this measure would be less likely to be persuaded by the expert treatment. Surprisingly, we find no evidence for our expectation. In fact, we find evidence for the opposite: respondents that are more supportive of expertise are more convinced by the historical analogy relative to when the president appeals to experts. Perhaps this is because this category of respondents respects the *president's* expertise when he employs a historical analogy.


**Table E-4:** Study #3 Historical Analogies vs. Gut and Expert Justifications

	Best Policy		Success		Benefits > Costs		Positive Pres Traits		Moral Obligation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Historical Analogy vs. Gut/Instinct Explanation	0.172** (0.083)		0.030 (0.066)		0.099* (0.051)		0.263*** (0.063)		0.085 (0.085)	
Historical Analogy vs. Appeal to Experts		0.080 (0.078)		0.034 (0.063)		0.099** (0.049)		0.131** (0.059)		0.131 (0.083)
Republican President	-0.013 (0.083)	-0.004 (0.078)	0.040 (0.065)	0.012 (0.063)	0.040 (0.051)	0.010 (0.049)	-0.024 (0.062)	-0.119** (0.059)	0.018 (0.084)	0.030 (0.082)
Hawkishness	0.455*** (0.051)	0.481*** (0.049)	0.356*** (0.040)	0.390*** (0.043)	0.257*** (0.034)	0.240*** (0.035)	0.273*** (0.043)	0.285*** (0.039)	0.403*** (0.057)	0.400*** (0.056)
Stronger Republican	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.015 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	-0.031*** (0.009)	-0.027*** (0.009)	-0.042*** (0.013)	-0.019 (0.013)
Foreign Policy Knowledge	-0.074 (0.200)	0.179 (0.195)	0.046 (0.158)	0.089 (0.169)	-0.227* (0.131)	-0.084 (0.120)	0.277* (0.160)	0.425*** (0.150)	-0.016 (0.206)	0.312 (0.211)
Education	0.055 (0.096)	0.019 (0.091)	0.065 (0.074)	-0.057 (0.073)	0.053 (0.061)	-0.014 (0.058)	-0.016 (0.072)	0.010 (0.066)	0.116 (0.097)	0.061 (0.093)
Male	0.120 (0.084)	0.236*** (0.079)	0.054 (0.066)	0.137** (0.064)	0.061 (0.053)	0.010 (0.051)	0.064 (0.064)	0.030 (0.059)	0.076 (0.086)	0.195** (0.083)
Income	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.007)
Age	0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)
White	-0.159* (0.093)	-0.136 (0.084)	-0.091 (0.074)	-0.121* (0.071)	-0.156*** (0.059)	-0.113** (0.057)	0.037 (0.075)	-0.057 (0.069)	0.002 (0.096)	-0.148 (0.096)
Constant	1.832*** (0.224)	1.941*** (0.212)	2.347*** (0.183)	2.332*** (0.182)	2.270*** (0.152)	2.427*** (0.141)	2.538*** (0.185)	2.624*** (0.163)	2.252*** (0.227)	2.073*** (0.227)
Observations	736	733	736	733	736	733	736	733	736	732

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. \* = p < 0.10; \*\* = p < 0.05; \*\*\* = p < 0.01.

While comparing the effect of analogical appeals to the effect of other policy justifications was our primary focus in Study 3, we are not only interested in comparisons between our justification conditions. Also of note is that all forms of policy justification— analogical appeals, appeals to expertise, and appeals to gut instinct—move attitudes relative to the control condition in which no justification is given. Moreover, these different policy justifications operate through similar mechanisms. Both instinctual appeals and appeals to experts also work by improving perceptions of policy success, perceptions that a policy’s benefits outweigh its costs, perceptions that the president has positive traits, and perceptions that the U.S. has a moral obligation to intervene.

**Figure E-2:** Study #3 Policy Justifications Move Attitudes in Similar Ways



Note: We plot the impact of historical analogies, appeals to expertise, and appeals to instinct on the main outcomes. Thick and thin bars are 90 and 95% confidence intervals.

## E.5 Pre-Registered Hypotheses

- Historical Analogies vs. Control & Gut Justification: When a leader uses a historical analogy to justify a foreign policy decision, then audiences should be more positively disposed towards the policy and the leader compared to when a leader does not use a historical analogy or uses their intuition/gut to justify a policy.
  - Mostly Supported
- Historical Analogies vs. Expert Justification: Relative to other forms of expert justification, when a leader uses a historical analogy to justify a foreign policy decision, then audiences should not be more positively or negatively disposed towards the policy and the leader.
  - Mostly Supported
- Anti-Expert Moderator: Relative to other forms of expert justification, when a leader uses a historical analogy to justify a foreign policy decision, then respondents more skeptical of experts should be more positively disposed towards the policy and the leader.
  - Not Supported

## F Survey Questionnaires

### F.1 Pre-Treatment Items

[Some Demographic Information Collected by [Lucid](#)]

#### Informed Consent<sup>20</sup>

[Standard Consent Form]

I have read the consent form, and I do not want to participate  
I want to continue with this study in this study

---

#### Age Eligibility & Attention Screener

- Are you eighteen years of age or older?<sup>21</sup>
  - Yes
  - No

We would like to get a sense of your general preferences.

Most modern theories of decision making recognize that decisions do not take place in a vacuum. Individual preferences and knowledge, along with situational variables, can greatly impact the decision process. To demonstrate that you've read this much, just go ahead and select both red and green among the alternatives below, no matter what your favorite color is. Yes, ignore the question below and select both of these options.

- What is your favorite color?<sup>22</sup>
  - Black
  - Red
  - Pink
  - Green
  - Blue

---

<sup>20</sup>If respondents answer "No" to the consent, then they are removed from the study.

<sup>21</sup>If respondents answer "No" to the age eligibility question, then they are removed from the study.

<sup>22</sup>If respondents do not answer exactly "red" and "green" then they are removed from the study. This question is adapted from [Berinsky et al. \(2021\)](#).

## U.S. Sample Party Identification

- Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a...
  - Democrat
  - Republican
  - Independent
  - Other
- Would you call yourself a strong [Democrat/Republican] or a not so strong [Democrat/Republican]?<sup>23</sup>
  - Strong [Democrat/Republican]
  - Not so strong [Democrat/Republican]
- Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party or Republican Party?<sup>24</sup>
  - The Democratic Party
  - The Republican Party
  - Neither

## Political Ideology

- In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?
  - Very liberal/left-wing
  - Liberal/left-wing
  - Moderate
  - Conservative/right-wing
  - Very conservative/right-wing

---

<sup>23</sup>This question is only presented to respondents who chose “Democrat” or “Republican” for the first question in this section.

<sup>24</sup>This question is only presented to respondents who chose “Independent” or “Other” for the first question in this section.

## Foreign Policy Dispositions<sup>25</sup>

Please select the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements:

	Strongly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Strongly Agree
<b>The best way to ensure world peace is through [<i>Respondent's Country</i>] military strength.</b>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<b>Going to war is unfortunate, but sometimes the only solution to international problems.</b>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<b>The use of military force only makes problems worse.</b>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## Foreign Policy Knowledge<sup>26</sup>

- Who was the U.S. engaged in the Cold War against?
  - Soviet Union
  - People's Republic of China
  - Mexico
  - Federal Republic of Germany
  - Democratic People's Republic of Korea
- Osama Bin Laden was the leader of which group?
  - al-Qaeda
  - Lord's Resistance Army
  - Irish Republican Army (IRA)
  - Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
  - The Red Army Faction
- The League of Nations is the predecessor to which international organization?
  - The United Nations
  - The European Union
  - Commonwealth of Nations
  - Association of Southeast Asian Nations
  - Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries

---

<sup>25</sup>We randomize the question order.

<sup>26</sup>We randomize the question and answer order.

- Which of the following countries is not a permanent member of the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council?
  - Germany
  - China
  - Russia
  - France
  - United Kingdom
  
- Which U.S. president effectively ended the Bretton Woods system?
  - Richard Nixon
  - Dwight Eisenhower
  - Gerald Ford
  - Ronald Reagan
  - George H.W. Bush

### Self-Reported Foreign Policy Knowledge

- Some people seem to follow what's going on in foreign and international affairs most of the time, whereas others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in foreign and international affairs...
  - Most of the time
  - Some of the time
  - Only now and then
  - Hardly at all
  - Never

## Negativity Bias<sup>27</sup>

Please select the extent to which the following words make you feel happy or unhappy:<sup>28</sup>

- Hardship
- Messy
- Death
- News
- Bus
- Body
- Laughter
- Party
- Waterfall

## Anti-Elitism, Anti-Expertise, and Anti-Politics Measures<sup>29</sup>

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:<sup>30</sup>

- Ordinary people don't know what policies are good for them.
- Political leaders should make decisions according to their best judgment, not the will of the people.
- I'd rather put my trust in the wisdom of ordinary people than the opinions of experts.
- If people were knowledgeable enough, everyone would agree on the political decisions that are best for the country.
- Politicians should be like managers and fix what does not work in society.
- The leaders of my country should be more educated and skilled than ordinary citizens.

---

<sup>27</sup>Only respondents in Study 2 receive these questions. See [Canache et al. \(2022\)](#) for a similar approach to measuring negativity bias.

<sup>28</sup>11-Point Likert Scale: Very Unhappy, Quite Unhappy, Moderately Unhappy, Somewhat Unhappy, Mildly Unhappy, Neutral, Mildly Happy, Somewhat Happy, Moderately Happy, Quite Happy, Very Happy. The first three words have a negative valence (mean = 2.43), the second three are more neutral (mean = 4.93), and the last three have a positive valence (mean = 8.06). See [bradley1999affective](#).

<sup>29</sup>These questions are only presented to respondents in Study 3.

<sup>30</sup>This question is measured on a 5-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The order of questions is randomized.

- Social problems should be addressed based on scientific evidence, not ideological preferences.
- The problems facing my country require experts to solve them.
- The best political decisions are taken by experts who are not politicians.
- Political parties do more harm than good to society.
- Politicians just want to promote the interests of those who vote for them and not the interest of the whole country.
- Politicians spend all their time seeking re-election instead of fixing problems.

## F.2 Study #1 Vignettes

On the next page, you will read a hypothetical foreign affairs scenario. Please read the scenario carefully because you will be asked questions to check your attention and comprehension.

### Study #1: U.S. Munich Control

The year is 2030. A major security concern for the US in 2030 is its very tense relationship with China. China remains a non-democracy. In 2030, the Chinese military is equally as strong as the US military. The US and China disagree over many important foreign policy issues.

One very tense issue relates to Taiwan. Taiwan is an island located near China. China is much bigger than Taiwan: whereas Taiwan has about 23 million people, China has about 1.4 billion people. Taiwan has been governing itself for several decades and is a democracy. However, China claims that Taiwan has always been part of China.

While this hostility over Taiwan's status has existed for decades between China and Taiwan, a new political leader emerges in China in 2030 threatening to use the Chinese military to make Taiwan part of China. Satellite imagery shows that China has put significant military assets in a position to attack Taiwan.

The U.S. President in 2030 is Stephen Richards, who is a lifelong [Republican/ Democrat]. He has said that his situation is unprecedented in U.S. history. Below is a quote from President Richards:

“This situation is unprecedented in U.S. history. China is actively preparing to seize Taiwan. We have never faced a threat like this before. Both political parties are very concerned about this. I am weighing every option to respond.”

After deliberating with his advisors, President Richards decided to pursue a policy of deploying the American military to directly prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan. If China decides to go through with their invasion plans and fighting does take place, then casualties are expected to be very high for both China and the United States.

## Study #1: U.S. Munich Treatment

The year is 2030. A major security concern for the US in 2030 is its very tense relationship with China. China remains a non-democracy. In 2030, the Chinese military is equally as strong as the US military. The US and China disagree over many important foreign policy issues.

One very tense issue relates to Taiwan. Taiwan is an island located near China. China is much bigger than Taiwan: whereas Taiwan has about 23 million people, China has about 1.4 billion people. Taiwan has been governing itself for several decades and is a democracy. However, China claims that Taiwan has always been part of China.

While this hostility over Taiwan's status has existed for decades between China and Taiwan, a new political leader emerges in China in 2030 threatening to use the Chinese military to make Taiwan part of China. Satellite imagery shows that China has put significant military assets in a position to attack Taiwan.

The U.S. President in 2030 is Stephen Richards, who is a lifelong [Democrat/ Republican]. He has said that this situation is similar to the Munich Agreement with Nazi Germany in 1938. Below is a quote from President Richards:

“China is actively preparing to seize Taiwan. Both political parties are very concerned about this. I am weighing every option to respond.

This scenario is very similar to the Munich Agreement. Prior to World War Two, Hitler wanted the Sudetenland. The Sudetenland was a part of Czechoslovakia where many ethnic Germans lived. Neville Chamberlain, the prime minister of Great Britain at the time, wanted a peaceful resolution to the situation. Chamberlain organized a meeting with Hitler, as well as leaders of France and Italy, and agreed to a peaceful resolution to the crisis called the Munich Agreement. In the Munich Agreement, these countries agreed to appease Hitler by giving him the Sudetenland in return for a promise by Germany not to make additional attempts to conquer territory outside of its borders. However, rather than serving to prevent future aggression by Hitler, many historians point to this appeasement of Hitler as a failed policy that motivated Hitler to pursue future land conquests, resulting in World War II.”

After deliberating with his advisors, President Richards decided to pursue a policy of deploying the American military to directly prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan. If China decides to go through with their invasion plans and fighting does take place, then casualties are expected to be very high for both China and the United States. This policy is the opposite approach to the Munich Agreement of 1938.

## Study #1: U.S. Cuban Missile Crisis Control

The year is 2030. A major security concern for the US in 2030 is its very tense relationship with China. China remains a non-democracy. In 2030, the Chinese military is equally as strong as the US military. The US and China disagree over many important issues.

One very tense issue is Chinese investment in the Western Hemisphere, namely in Central and South America. Traditionally, countries in Central and South America have proven close military allies and economic trading partners of the US. For much of US history, American leaders have declared that they will not tolerate foreign military bases in the Western Hemisphere. In 2030, China is expanding its military and economic influence with Central and South American countries. US officials are particularly concerned about growing Chinese influence in Panama, which could threaten US interests throughout the region.

Recent US intelligence reports revealed that China is building a military base in Panama. Construction is in the early stages, but dozens of Chinese and Panamanian military officials are living at the base. China has also deployed nuclear missiles at the base that experts believe could strike the continental US.

The U.S. President in 2030 is Stephen Richards, who is a lifelong [Democrat/ Republican]. He has said that this situation is unprecedented in U.S. history. Here is a quote from President Richards:

“China has built a military base in America’s backyard. We have never faced a threat like this before. Both political parties are very concerned about this. I am weighing every option to respond.”

In a series of meetings with advisors, President Richards considered several options to respond to China:

- Diplomacy: The United States will not take any steps to prevent China from having a military base in Panama and in return China promises not to build any additional bases in Central or South America.
- Naval Blockade: Using U.S. Navy ships to block further Chinese access to the base in Panama.
- Airstrikes: Using U.S. aircraft to destroy the Chinese base.
- Boots on the Ground: Deploying American military personnel to Panama in order to destroy the Chinese base.

After deliberating, President Richards elected the naval blockade option to respond to China’s base construction in Panama.

## Study #1: U.S. Cuban Missile Crisis Treatment

The year is 2030. A major security concern for the US in 2030 is its very tense relationship with China. China remains a non-democracy. In 2030, the Chinese military is equally as strong as the US military. The US and China disagree over many important issues.

One very tense issue is Chinese investment in the Western Hemisphere, namely in Central and South America. Traditionally, countries in Central and South America have proven close military allies and economic trading partners of the US. For much of US history, American leaders have declared that they will not tolerate foreign military bases in the Western Hemisphere. In 2030, China is expanding its military and economic influence with Central and South American countries. US officials are particularly concerned about growing Chinese influence in Panama, which could threaten US interests throughout the region.

Recent US intelligence reports revealed that China is building a military base in Panama. Construction is in the early stages, but dozens of Chinese and Panamanian military officials are living at the base. China has also deployed nuclear missiles at the base that experts believe could strike the continental US.

The U.S. President in 2030 is Stephen Richards, who is a lifelong [Democrat/ Republican]. He has said that this situation is similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Here is a quote from President Richards:

“China has built a military base in America’s backyard. Both political parties are very concerned about this. I am weighing every option to respond. We faced a threat like this in 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the Soviet Union built a military base in Cuba and deployed nuclear missiles that could strike the continental US. John F. Kennedy, the US president at the time, decided to impose a naval blockade around Cuba in order to block the Soviet Union from being able to deploy any additional missiles or military personnel to Cuba. In the end, the Soviet Union decided to back down and agreed to withdraw all of their missiles from Cuba. Many historians point to the imposition of the naval blockade as a successful policy that enhanced the United States’ security.”

In a series of meetings with advisors, President Richards considered several options to respond to China:

- Diplomacy: The United States will not take any steps to prevent China from having a military base in Panama and in return China promises not to build any additional bases in Central or South America.
- Naval Blockade: Using U.S. Navy ships to block further Chinese access to the base in Panama.
- Airstrikes: Using U.S. aircraft to destroy the Chinese base.
- Boots on the Ground: Deploying American military personnel to Panama in order to destroy the Chinese base.

After deliberating, President Richards elected the naval blockade option to respond to China's base construction in Panama. This is the same approach the U.S. took during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.

### F.3 Study #2 Vignettes

On the next page, you will read a hypothetical foreign affairs scenario. Please **read the scenario carefully** because you will be **asked questions to check your attention and comprehension**.

#### Study #2: Control Condition Myanmar Scenario

The year is 2030 and there is currently a humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. The government of Myanmar is killing civilian members of the Rohingya minority group. The US President in 2030 is Stephen Richards, who is a lifelong member of the [Democratic/Republican] Party.

After deliberating with his advisors, President Richards decided to promptly and without delay pursue a policy of conducting airstrikes against the military forces of Myanmar in order to prevent them from killing civilian members of the Rohingya minority group. President Richards said the following to justify his policy:

#### Study #2: U.S. Positive Valence Bosnia Analogy

The year is 2030 and there is currently a humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. The government of Myanmar is killing civilian members of the Rohingya minority group. The US President in 2030 is Stephen Richards, who is a lifelong member of the [Democratic/Republican] Party.

After deliberating with his advisors, President Richards decided to promptly and without delay pursue a policy of conducting airstrikes against the military forces of Myanmar in order to prevent them from killing civilian members of the Rohingya minority group. President Richards said the following to justify his policy:

“This scenario is very similar to the US intervention in Bosnia in the 1990s. In the early 1990s, Bosnia was part of the country of Yugoslavia. It consisted of three main ethnic groups: Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. In 1992, Bosnia passed a referendum calling for independence from Yugoslavia. Serbs, who did not want to separate from Yugoslavia, responded by engaging in significant violence against Bosniak and Croat civilians, which resulted in tens of thousands of deaths. In 1995, the US intervened by conducting significant airstrikes against the Serb aggressors. The Bosnian military intervention was a major humanitarian success. By helping end the war, America’s decision to use force played a major role in saving tens of thousands of innocent lives.

The United States must take the same approach in Myanmar we took in Bosnia. Doing so will help end the killing of civilians in Myanmar.”

## Study #2: U.S. Negative Valence Bosnia Analogy

The year is 2030 and there is currently a humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. The government of Myanmar is killing civilian members of the Rohingya minority group. The US President in 2030 is Stephen Richards, who is a lifelong member of the [Democratic/Republican] Party.

After deliberating with his advisors, President Richards decided to promptly and without delay pursue a policy of conducting airstrikes against the military forces of Myanmar in order to prevent them from killing civilian members of the Rohingya minority group. President Richards said the following to justify his policy:

“This scenario is very similar to the US intervention in Bosnia in the 1990s. In the early 1990s, Bosnia was part of the country of Yugoslavia. It consisted of three main ethnic groups: Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. In 1992, Bosnia passed a referendum calling for independence from Yugoslavia. Serbs, who did not want to separate from Yugoslavia, responded by engaging in significant violence against Bosniak and Croat civilians, which resulted in tens of thousands of deaths. In 1995, the US intervened by conducting significant airstrikes against the Serb aggressors. Although this military action may have helped end the war sooner and save innocent lives, the Bosnian intervention was a major humanitarian failure. By waiting so long to intervene, tens of thousands of innocent lives were lost that could have been saved if the United States had acted sooner.

The United States must take a different approach in Myanmar we took in Bosnia. Acting without delay will help end the killing of civilians in Myanmar.”

## Study #2: U.S. Control Condition Iran Scenario

The year is 2027. A major security concern for the US in 2027 is its very tense relationship with Iran. Iran remains a non-democracy. In 2027, the Iranian military is still significantly weaker than the United States military. The US and Iran disagree over many important foreign policy issues.

One very tense issue relates to Iran's nuclear program. Despite the genuine efforts by the US and other major powers, Iran has not been willing to rejoin a diplomatic agreement that would prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons in return for relief from economic sanctions. Instead, Iran has continued to produce and stockpile highly enriched uranium, which could be used to build a nuclear weapon.

Moreover, in 2027, the United States, United Kingdom, French, and German intelligence agencies have received credible information from multiple sources that Iran intends to build a nuclear weapon within the next 4 weeks. Satellite imagery also confirms that the Iranian government is taking concrete steps to assemble a nuclear weapon in the next few weeks.

The US President in 2027 is Stephen Richards, who is a lifelong member of the [Democratic/Republican] Party. Some foreign policy experts are urging President Richards to conduct a limited military operation that would use only airstrikes in an attempt to destroy Iran's nuclear infrastructure and thus prevent them from building a nuclear weapon in the short-term. Other foreign policy experts argue that this does not go far enough. Since Iran's government seems intent on acquiring a nuclear weapon, only a larger-scale military operation with "boots on the ground" that overthrows the Iranian government will prevent them from acquiring a nuclear weapon in the medium or long-term. These experts also argue that because many of Iran's nuclear facilities are buried deep underground, airstrikes alone may not be able to fully destroy Iran's capacity to build a nuclear weapon in the short-term. A third group argues the US should not get involved at all given the risks of American casualties and the possibility that Iran will retaliate against US soldiers stationed in the region or our allies.

After deliberating with his advisors, President Richards decided to conduct a limited military operation rather than attempt to overthrow the Iranian government and meddle in Iran's internal politics.

## Study #2: U.S. High Familiarity Vietnam Analogy

The year is 2027. A major security concern for the US in 2027 is its very tense relationship with Iran. Iran remains a non-democracy. In 2027, the Iranian military is still significantly weaker than the United States military. The US and Iran disagree over many important foreign policy issues.

One very tense issue relates to Iran's nuclear program. Despite the genuine efforts by the US and other major powers, Iran has not been willing to rejoin a diplomatic agreement that would prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons in return for relief from economic sanctions. Instead, Iran has continued to produce and stockpile highly enriched uranium, which could be used to build a nuclear weapon.

Moreover, in 2027, the United States, United Kingdom, French, and German intelligence agencies have received credible information from multiple sources that Iran intends to build a nuclear weapon within the next 4 weeks. Satellite imagery also confirms that the Iranian government is taking concrete steps to assemble a nuclear weapon in the next few weeks.

The US President in 2027 is Stephen Richards, who is a lifelong member of the [Democratic/Republican] Party. Some foreign policy experts are urging President Richards to conduct a limited military operation that would use only airstrikes in an attempt to destroy Iran's nuclear infrastructure and thus prevent them from building a nuclear weapon in the short-term. Other foreign policy experts argue that this does not go far enough. Since Iran's government seems intent on acquiring a nuclear weapon, only a larger-scale military operation with "boots on the ground" that overthrows the Iranian government will prevent them from acquiring a nuclear weapon in the medium or long-term. These experts also argue that because many of Iran's nuclear facilities are buried deep underground, airstrikes alone may not be able to fully destroy Iran's capacity to build a nuclear weapon in the short-term. A third group argues the US should not get involved at all given the risks of American casualties and the possibility that Iran will retaliate against US soldiers stationed in the region or our allies.

After deliberating with his advisors, President Richards decided to conduct a limited military operation rather than attempt to overthrow the Iranian government and meddle in Iran's internal politics. President Richards said the following to justify his policy:

"My decision not to engage in regime change and attempt to overthrow the Iranian government is informed by America's War in Vietnam in the 1960's and 1970's. During the War in Vietnam, the United States deployed tens of thousands of soldiers. Broadly speaking, the goal of the conflict was to intervene in Vietnam's internal politics such that the Vietnamese government would not oppose core US interests. However, the decision to get involved in Vietnam's internal politics and engage in regime change was a disaster. Predictably, this kind of military operation angered the people of Vietnam and caused many of them to engage in armed resistance against the deployed US troops in order to regain their independence. As a result, thousands of US soldiers were killed. I have therefore chosen not to repeat the mistakes of the Vietnam War in the current crisis with Iran."

## Study #2: U.S. Low Familiarity Philippines Analogy

The year is 2027. A major security concern for the US in 2027 is its very tense relationship with Iran. Iran remains a non-democracy. In 2027, the Iranian military is still significantly weaker than the United States military. The US and Iran disagree over many important foreign policy issues.

One very tense issue relates to Iran's nuclear program. Despite the genuine efforts by the US and other major powers, Iran has not been willing to rejoin a diplomatic agreement that would prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons in return for relief from economic sanctions. Instead, Iran has continued to produce and stockpile highly enriched uranium, which could be used to build a nuclear weapon.

Moreover, in 2027, the United States, United Kingdom, French, and German intelligence agencies have received credible information from multiple sources that Iran intends to build a nuclear weapon within the next 4 weeks. Satellite imagery also confirms that the Iranian government is taking concrete steps to assemble a nuclear weapon in the next few weeks.

The US President in 2027 is Stephen Richards, who is a lifelong member of the [Democratic/Republican] Party. Some foreign policy experts are urging President Richards to conduct a limited military operation that would use only airstrikes in an attempt to destroy Iran's nuclear infrastructure and thus prevent them from building a nuclear weapon in the short-term. Other foreign policy experts argue that this does not go far enough. Since Iran's government seems intent on acquiring a nuclear weapon, only a larger-scale military operation with "boots on the ground" that overthrows the Iranian government will prevent them from acquiring a nuclear weapon in the medium or long-term. These experts also argue that because many of Iran's nuclear facilities are buried deep underground, airstrikes alone may not be able to fully destroy Iran's capacity to build a nuclear weapon in the short-term. A third group argues the US should not get involved at all given the risks of American casualties and the possibility that Iran will retaliate against US soldiers stationed in the region or our allies.

After deliberating with his advisors, President Richards decided to conduct a limited military operation rather than attempt to overthrow the Iranian government and meddle in Iran's internal politics. President Richards said the following to justify his policy:

"My decision not to engage in regime change and attempt to overthrow the Iranian government is informed by America's War in the Philippines between 1899 and 1902. During the War in the Philippines, the United States deployed tens of thousands of soldiers. Broadly speaking, the goal of the conflict was to intervene in the Philippines' internal politics such that the Filipino government would not oppose core US interests. However, the decision to get involved in the Philippines' internal politics and engage in regime change was a disaster. Predictably, this kind of military operation angered the people of the Philippines and caused many of them to engage in armed resistance against the deployed US troops in order to regain their independence. As a result, thousands of US soldiers were killed. I have therefore chosen not to repeat the mistakes of the Philippines War in the current crisis with Iran."

## F.4 Study #3 Vignettes

### Study #3: Control

The year is 2030. A major security concern for the US in 2030 is its very tense relationship with China. China remains a non-democracy. In 2030, the Chinese military is equally as strong as the US military. The US and China disagree over many important foreign policy issues.

One very tense issue relates to Taiwan. Taiwan is an island located near China. China is much bigger than Taiwan: whereas Taiwan has about 23 million people, China has about 1.4 billion people. Taiwan has been governing itself for several decades and is a democracy. However, China claims that Taiwan has always been part of China.

While this hostility over Taiwan's status has existed for decades between China and Taiwan, a new political leader emerges in China in 2030 threatening to use the Chinese military to make Taiwan part of China. Satellite imagery shows that China has put significant military assets in a position to attack Taiwan.

The U.S. President in 2030 is Stephen Richards, who is a lifelong [Republican/ Democrat]. He has said that

“China is actively preparing to seize Taiwan. We have never faced a threat like this before. Both political parties are rightly very concerned about this.

After much consideration, I have decided to deploy the American military to directly prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan. If China decides to go through with their invasion plans and fighting does take place, then I expect casualties will be very high for both China and the United States, but, in the end, I believe America will prevail on the battlefield.”

### Study #3: Munich Analogy

“China is actively preparing to seize Taiwan. Both political parties are rightly very concerned about this.

After much consideration, I have decided to deploy the American military to directly prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan. If China decides to go through with their invasion plans and fighting does take place, then I expect casualties will be very high for both China and the United States, but, in the end, I believe America will prevail on the battlefield.

Why have I decided to risk the lives of American soldiers and risk a war with China? I am doing so because after studying the lessons of history, I believe that failing to act would simply lead to more Chinese aggression in the future. For example, prior to World War II, European leaders like British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain appeased Hitler in the infamous Munich Agreement with the Nazis in 1938. This diplomatic agreement gave Hitler land in Czechoslovakia in return for a promise by Germany not to make additional attempts to conquer territory outside of its borders. However, rather than serving to prevent future aggression by Hitler, appeasing Nazi Germany was a failed policy that motivated Hitler to pursue future land conquests, resulting in World War II. Like Nazi Germany, China may have expansionist goals, the psychology of its leaders may dispose them to aggression, and China has strong military capabilities that could enable them to expand their territory further beyond Taiwan. Allowing China to take over Taiwan would likely just embolden them to pursue future land conquests.”

### Study #3: Expert

“China is actively preparing to seize Taiwan. Both political parties are rightly very concerned about this.

After much consideration, I have decided to deploy the American military to directly prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan. If China decides to go through with their invasion plans and fighting does take place, then I expect casualties will be very high for both China and the United States, but, in the end, I believe America will prevail on the battlefield.

Why have I decided to risk the lives of American soldiers and risk a war with China? I am doing so because after consulting with Department of Defense and State Department experts who have studied China extensively over a period of decades, I believe that failing to act would simply lead to more Chinese aggression in the future. This is based on the assessment of experts that China has expansionist goals, the psychology of their leaders disposes them to aggression, and China has strong military capabilities that could enable them to expand their territory further beyond Taiwan. Allowing China to take over Taiwan would likely just embolden them to pursue future land conquests.”

### Study #3: Intuition

“China is actively preparing to seize Taiwan. Both political parties are rightly very concerned about this.

After much consideration, I have decided to deploy the American military to directly prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan. If China decides to go through with their invasion plans and fighting does take place, then I expect casualties will be very high for both China and the United States, but, in the end, I believe America will prevail on the battlefield.

Why have I decided to risk the lives of American soldiers and risk a war with China? I am doing so because my intuition and gut are strongly telling me that failing to act would simply lead to more Chinese aggression in the future. I have a feeling in my stomach that China has expansionist goals, the psychology of their leaders disposes them to aggression, and China has strong military capabilities that could enable them to expand their territory further beyond Taiwan. Allowing China to take over Taiwan would likely just embolden them to pursue future land conquests.”

## F.5 Dependent Variables

### Dependent Variable Questions<sup>31</sup>

- To what extent do you agree with the following statement:

President Richards chose the best strategy for dealing with [China/Iran/Myanmar].

- Strongly agree
  - Somewhat agree
  - Neither agree nor disagree
  - Somewhat disagree
  - Strongly disagree
- Based on this information, do you approve of how President Richards is doing his job?
    - Strongly approve
    - Somewhat approve
    - Neither approve nor disapprove
    - Somewhat disapprove
    - Strongly disapprove
  - Based on this information, how likely would you be to vote to re-elect President Richards?
    - Very likely
    - Unlikely
    - Neither likely nor unlikely
    - Likely
    - Very likely

To what extent do you agree with each of the following statements?<sup>32</sup>

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
The cost of President Richards' chosen policy are high.					
The benefits of President Richards' chosen policy are high.					
The benefits of President Richards' chosen policy outweigh the costs.					

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<sup>31</sup>Question order is randomized.

<sup>32</sup>The order of questions in this matrix is randomized.

- How likely is it that President Richards' chosen policy in the scenario you read above will lead to a successful outcome for the United States?
  - Very unlikely
  - Unlikely
  - Neither likely nor unlikely
  - Likely
  - Very likely
  
- How likely is it that President Richards' chosen policy in the scenario you read above will prevent China from invading other countries besides Taiwan?<sup>33</sup>
  - Very unlikely
  - Unlikely
  - Neither likely nor unlikely
  - Likely
  - Very likely
  
- How likely is it that President Richards' chosen policy in the scenario you read above will force China to dismantle its military base in Panama?<sup>34</sup>
  - Very unlikely
  - Unlikely
  - Neither likely nor unlikely
  - Likely
  - Very likely
  
- How likely is it that President Richards' chosen policy in the scenario you read above will save thousands of innocent lives in a timely manner?<sup>35</sup>
  - Very unlikely
  - Unlikely
  - Neither likely nor unlikely
  - Likely
  - Very likely

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<sup>33</sup> Asked only to subjects in the China invades Taiwan scenarios in Studies 1 and 3.

<sup>34</sup> Asked only to subjects in the China builds a military base scenario in Study 1.

<sup>35</sup> Asked only to subjects in the Myanmar scenario in Study 2.

- How likely is it that President Richards' chosen policy in the scenario you read above will prevent a military disaster for the United States resulting in the loss of thousands of American lives?<sup>36</sup>
  - Very unlikely
  - Unlikely
  - Neither likely nor unlikely
  - Likely
  - Very likely
  
- How likely is it that the President's policy will help prevent China from overtaking the United States as the world's most powerful and influential country?<sup>37</sup>
  - Very unlikely
  - Unlikely
  - Neither likely nor unlikely
  - Likely
  - Very likely
  
- How likely is it that the President's policy will help prevent [Iran/Myanmar] from threatening the US' core foreign policy interests?<sup>38</sup>
  - Very unlikely
  - Unlikely
  - Neither likely nor unlikely
  - Likely
  - Very likely

To what extent do you agree that President Richards is:<sup>39</sup>

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
Intelligent					
Competent					
Knowledgeable about History					

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<sup>36</sup> Asked only to subjects in the Iran scenario in Study 2.

<sup>37</sup> Asked only to subjects in Studies 1 and 3.

<sup>38</sup> Asked only to subjects in Study 2.

<sup>39</sup> The order of questions in this matrix is randomized.

Based on the scenario you read about [China/Iran/Myanmar], how does the proposed course of action by President Richards make you feel?<sup>40</sup>

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
Worried					
Angry					
Fearful					
Patriotic					

How does [China's/Iran's/Myanmar's] action in the scenario you read make you feel?<sup>41</sup>

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
Worried					
Angry					
Fearful					
Patriotic					

- To what extent do you agree with that President is:
  - A Pacifist
  - A Warmonger

- To what extent do you agree with the following statement:

In this scenario, the United States has a moral obligation to intervene to prevent China from conquering Taiwan.<sup>42</sup>

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

- To what extent do you agree with the following statement:

In this scenario, the United States has a moral obligation to intervene to prevent China from building a base in Panama.<sup>43</sup>

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree

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<sup>40</sup>The order of questions in this matrix is randomized.

<sup>41</sup>The order of questions in this matrix is randomized.

<sup>42</sup>Asked only to subjects in the China invades Taiwan scenarios in Studies 1 and 3

<sup>43</sup>Asked only to subjects in the China builds a military base scenario in Study 1.

- Strongly disagree

- To what extent do you agree with the following statement:

In this scenario, the United States has a moral obligation to intervene to protect the Rohingya from being killed.<sup>44</sup>

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

- To what extent do you agree with the following statement:

In this scenario, the United States has a moral obligation to intervene to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.<sup>45</sup>

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

What are your thoughts about President Richards and the situation with [China/Iran/Myanmar] described above?

Text Response

- What are four words that come to mind when you think about President Richards?

- Word 1:
- Word 2:
- Word 3:
- Word 4:

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<sup>44</sup>Asked only to subjects in the Myanmar scenario in Study 2.

<sup>45</sup>Asked only to subjects in the Iran scenario in Study 2.

- What are four words that come to mind when you think about the situation with [China/Russia/Myanmar] described above?
  - Word 1:
  - Word 2:
  - Word 3:
  - Word 4:
- Here is a summary of the situation, for your reference: The year is 2030 and China has threatened to invade Taiwan. President Richards has decided to deploy the U.S. military to directly prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan.<sup>46</sup>

**Here’s what happened next:** The American military deployment convinced China not to invade Taiwan.

Based on this new information, do you approve of how President Richards is doing his job?

- Strongly approve
  - Somewhat approve
  - Neither approve nor disapprove
  - Somewhat disapprove
  - Strongly disapprove
- Here is a summary of the situation, for your reference: The year is 2030 and China has built a military base in Panama. President Richards has decided to enact a Naval blockade around Panama to block further Chinese access to the base.<sup>47</sup>

**Here’s what happened next:** The American naval blockade stopped Chinese ships delivering supplies to the base in Panama. Soon after the blockade was imposed, China agreed to withdraw its base in Panama.

Based on this new information, do you approve of how President Richards is doing his job?

- Strongly approve
- Somewhat approve
- Neither approve nor disapprove
- Somewhat disapprove
- Strongly disapprove

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<sup>46</sup> Asked only to subjects in the China invades Taiwan scenario in Studies 1 and 3.

<sup>47</sup> Asked only to subjects in the China invades Taiwan scenario in Studies 1 and 3.

Before participating in this study, to what extent were you familiar with the details of the following wars?:<sup>48</sup>

	Not at all familiar	Slightly familiar	Somewhat familiar	Familiar	Very familiar
Vietnam War (1955-1975)					
Philippine-American War (1899-1902)					

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<sup>48</sup>The order of questions in this matrix is randomized. This question is only presented to respondents in the Iran scenario in Study 2.

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